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TRIANGULATING THE LIMITS ON THE TORT OF
INVASION OF PRIVACY: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE REMEDY IN LIGHT OF THE
EXPANSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVILEGE
By Michael P. Lehmann*
Introduction
The tort of invasion of privacy1 operates in many circumstances as
a constraint on freedom of expression. It is used as a policing device
that regulates the exercise of the First Amendment right of freedom of
expression in conformity with the mores of the local community.
The Supreme Court has deemed both privacy and freedom of
expression to be fundamental constitutional rights. The Court has
consistently stated that freedom of expression is crucial and deserves
extensive protection from infringement; as the Court pointed out in
Thornhill v. Alabama,2 this right must embrace all issues about which
the citizenry requires information in order to fulfill its function in a free
society.3 Justice Brennan relied upon similar expressions of principle in
his opinion for the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' which held
* Member, second year class.
1. Four types of invasion of privacy are commonly recognized: intrusion (physi-
cal invasion of the plaintiff's solitude), appropriation (pecuniary exploitation of plain-
tiff's name, identity or likeness), false light in the public eye (presentation of plaintiff in
a false, though not necessarily defamatory, light before the public), and public disclosure
of private facts (giving publicity to intimate but true facts about the plaintiff). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389-407 (1960). See also Bloustein, Privacy
as An Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962,
964 n.10 (1964); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093,
1095 n.13 (1962).
This note will focus only upon the latter two branches of the tort because any First
Amendment privilege applies, if at all, exclusively to these two variants. See PRossan,
supra, § 118 at 827; Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd
and modified, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
3. Id. at 102.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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that a libelous statement about a public official, published without knowl-
edge or reckless disregard of its falsity, was not actionable. The decision
rested on the theory that the First Amendment evinces "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials." 5
The Court has also recognized, however, that other interests may
outweigh freedom of expression in proper circumstances.6 As Justice
Harlan noted in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California:'
![We] reject the view that freedom of speech and association, as pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are "absolutes".
. . . Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized
at least two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of
speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one
hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has
been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection ...
On the other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to con-
trol the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered ex-
ercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Four-
teenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when
they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental
interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily in-
volved a weighing of the governmental interest involved.8
Despite these caveats, early libel and invasion of privacy cases
concluded that freedom of expression should be accorded the utmost
deference. In one such case, a district court noted: "Although
5. Id. at 270.
6. See, e.g., with respect to subversive advocacy: United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1951);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See, e.g., with respect to "fighting
words": Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
320-21 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). See, e.g.,
with respect to obscenity: United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1971); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-83 (1957). See, e.g., with respect to libel in general:
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,
366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48
(1961); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931); Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
7. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
8. Id. at 49-51 (footnotes and citations omitted). For articles with prescriptive
suggestions for the resolution of the conflict between privacy and free expression, see,
e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIoN 548-57 (1970); Beytagh,
Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20 N.Y.LF. 453, 498-
504 (1975); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment The-
ory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAiF. L. REv. 935, 959-67 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Nimmer].
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what is of public concern is not as yet a clearly defined field of the law,
it has been held that even in borderline cases the benefit of doubt should
be cast in favor of protecting the publication."9
The Supreme Court has also recognized a fundamental right of
privacy.10 As early as 1891, in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Bots-
ford," the Court recognized that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law."' 2 The Fourth Amendment provided the basis for a
long line of Supreme Court decisions that posited the individual's right to
be free from intrusions upon privacy.' 3 Only during the past decade
has the Court restricted the scope of tort actions for invasion of privacy
in order to safeguard the interest of free speech. This note examines the
series of cases beginning with Time, Inc. v. Hill,'4 and extending
through Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,'5 in which the Court has
expanded the defense of privilege based on the First Amendment right
of free expression in suits framed upon the theory of invasion of privacy.
9. Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212, 1220 (E.D. Tenn.
1968), afj'd, 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969). Accord, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing
Co., 484 F.2d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 1973); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489,
491 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
10. "Right of privacy" is a difficult phrase to define. The most concise definition
is simply "the right to be let alone." T. CooLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
But this definition is too broad. Alternative formulations suffer the same defect. See,
e.g., A. WESTIN, PmivAcY AND FAEDOM 7 (1967); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,
482-83 (1968); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 34, 35-36 (1967);
Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 L. & CONTEMP. POB. 272,
279-80 (1966); Ruebhausen and Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L.
R v. 1184, 1189 (1965). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting).
For the purposes of this note, the following definition of privacy is used: "Mhe le-
gally recognized freedom or power of an individual (group, association, [or] class) to
determine the extent to which another individual (group, class, association, or govern-
ment) may (a) obtain or make use of his ideas, writings, name, likeness, or other indicia
of identity, or (b) obtain or reveal information about him or those for whom he is per-
sonally responsible, or (c) intrude physically or in more subtle ways into his life space
and his chosen activities." Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law,, 31 L. &
CONTEMP. PRon. 253, 254 (1966).
11. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
12. Id. at 251.
13. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 132 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1877).
14. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
15. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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The first section of this note considers whether the right of free
speech and the rights protected by the tort action for invasion of privacy
are coequal in importance, especially in light of the Supreme Court's
dictum in the recent case of Paul v. Davis. 6 In conjunction with this
discussion, the author asks whether preference for one interest over the
other, as occurred in Time, Inc. v. Hill, is improper.
The next three sections triangulate the limits currently placed on
the tort of invasion of privacy by the constitutional privilege for libel
created in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.17  This task is accom-
plished by plotting the perimeters within which such an action must be
brought. These perimeters are created by three factors: the actual
malice test, the public figure/private person distinction, and the issue of
damages. Section five considers whether the constitutional privilege,
which originated in the context of libel suits, should be extended to limit
the right of recovery in privacy actions. The argument is made that of
the three factors determining the libel privilege, the actual malice test, to
the extent it involves the issue of falsity, may have no application to
invasions of privacy through public disclosure of private facts.
The conclusion links the assumptions developed in section one with
the considerations discussed in section five. The author suggests that,
to the extent that the right of privacy is deemed to be a fundamental
constitutional right, the automatic deference to the right of free speech
implicit in the New York Times rule should have no place in invasion of
privacy suits. This note does not arrive at hard and fast conclusions
about the relationship of the New York Times privilege and invasion of
privacy actions. It attempts rather to highlight the crucial questions left
16. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times is a libel case. Throughout this note
extensive reference is made for several reasons to libel cases decided by the federal
courts. First, the paucity of decisions (especially Supreme Court decisions) in invasion
of privacy actions necessitates consideration of the holdings in defamation cases where
an analogy to the area of privacy is likely to be drawn. Second, dicta in defamation
cases often directly refer to the area of invasion of privacy. Third, the courts often
carry over concepts and doctrines from the area of libel to that of invasion of privacy
and vice versa. For example, the test of actual malice, first applied in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan was transferred into the invasion of privacy area in Time, Inc. v. Hill.
Similarly, the public figure distinction inherent in Hill was subsequently carried back
into the field of libel by Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). While this
carryover is, in the author's opinion, incorrect, it is necessary to discuss what the federal
courts are doing as well as what they should be doing. Finally, libel and invasion of
privacy overlap, most noticeably in the false light variant of the latter tort. See
PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117 at 813; Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE
L.J. 1462, 1472 (1973). But see Nimmer, supra note 8, at 958. See also Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1967); Berry v. National Broadcasting Co., 480 F.2d
428, 431 (8th Cir. 1973); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 37 (S.D.N.Y.), affd,
505 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 3
unanswered in the Court's recent decisions and suggests possible solu-
tions to the problems underlying those questions.
I. Constitutional Underpinnings for the
Tort of Invasion of Privacy
The initial issue that must be confronted is whether, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,'8 the tort action
for invasion of privacy protects a constitutional right as fundamental as
that of free speech. Prior to Griswold, the major analysis of the
constitutional basis for a right of privacy was in York v. Story, 9 decided
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In that
case the plaintiff, who was present at a police station in order to file a
charge for criminal assault, was directed to undress by the defendant,
the police officer assigned to handle her complaint. She reluctantly
complied and was photographed in the nude by Story, who distributed
the photos among his colleagues. The plaintiff sued Story for invasion
of privacy, alleging, inter alia, deprivation of federal rights under the
Civil Rights Act.20  The district court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, plaintiff broadened her contentions by also alleging an unrea-
sonable search under the Fourth Amendment, violation of her right of
privacy, guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, in the
commission of the unreasonable search, and deprivation of liberty with-
out due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Wolf
v. Colorado,2 the court of appeals decided that privacy against person-
al intrusion was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"22 and
deemed the photographing of the nude body to be as substantial a
deprivation of that right as the searching of a residence without a
warrant. Finally, the court concluded that the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act afforded plaintiff a remedy in federal courts, despite the fact
that no portion of the Bill of Rights explicitly proscribed the conduct in
question. 23  Earlier and subsequent decisions cast doubt upon the via-
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970): "Every person who, under color of any statute, or-
dinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects. . . any citizen
of the United States . . .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
21. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
22. 324 F.2d at 455.
23. 324 F.2d at 455-56. The court relied on several earlier cases decided by vari-
ous circuits in support of this proposition: Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir.
1963); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961); Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1961); Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953); Koehler v.
United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951) (all dealing with assaults upon arrestees by
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bility of that holding.24  Six years after deciding York the same circuit
court of appeals reached a contrary result in Baker v. Howard,2 5 a case
involving the same section of the Civil Rights Act. The court explicitly
police officers); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961) (refusal of police offi-
cers to obtain medical attention for one in custody).
24. Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 524-25 (2d Cir. 1973) (no cause of action
was stated under the Civil Rights Act in the case of a false light invasion of privacy
suit); Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(complaint framed on a false light invasion of privacy theory presented no allegation
of the deprivation of any federally-guaranteed right); Bradford v. Lefkowitz, 240 F.
Supp. 969, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (held in a false light suit that the Civil Rights Act
"was not intended to incorporate every violation of a state right nor to provide pre-
emption of such rights in a federal remedy.").
In one respect at least, the unwillingness of the federal courts to admit that the
Civil Rights Act encompasses false light invasion of privacy suits is entirely consistent.
In many instances the tort complained of in such suits overlaps with the gravamen of
the complaint alleged in libel or slander actions; and the federal courts have consistently
held that a plaintiff may not sue for libel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Azar v. Conley,
456 F.2d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir. 1972); Church v. Hamilton, 444 F.2d 105, 106 (3d Cir.
1971); Association for Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Simon, 299 F.2d 212,
214 (2d Cir. 1962); Slegeski v. Ilg, 395 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (D. Conn. 1975); Schumate
v. New York, 373 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Keen v. Philadelphia Daily
News, 325 F. Supp. 929, 930 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Temple v. Pergament, 235 F. Supp. 242,
244 (D.N.J. 1964). Thus to the extent that false light invasion of privacy is an ana-
logue of libel, it may be logical to say that the Civil Rights Act does not permit a plain-
tiff to seek redress in the federal courts. The same cannot be said, however, for invasion
of privacy through public disclosure of private facts.
It should also be noted that these limitations do not apply to non-statutory means
of access to the federal courts. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971).
25. 419 F.2d 376, 377 (9th Cir. 1969) (the rationale of York is inapplicable in a
false light invasion of privacy case unless plaintiff is able to allege "such a gross
abuse of privacy as to amount to an abridgement of fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees.") Accord, Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1973); Kipps v.
Ewell, 391 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Va. 1975); Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110, 115
(D. Conn. 1966); Dixon v. Pennsylvania Crime Comm., 67 F.R.D. 425, 431-32 (M.D.
Pa. 1975). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). That case is especially inter-
esting in this context. In Paul, the police commissioner of Louisville, Kentucky, author-
ized the dissemination of a circular alleging that the respondent was an "active shop-
lifter." Davis had been arraigned over a year earlier on a charge of shoplifting, but
after he entered a plea of not guilty, the charge had been filed away "with leave to rein-
state"; it was, in fact, dropped shortly after publication of the circular. As a result of
such publication, Davis' reputation was substantially besmirched. He brought a class ac-
tion in a federal district court for damages and injunctive relief, alleging both inyasion
of privacy and deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court granted the petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed solely on the ground that
Davis had sufficiently alleged a denial of due process under the terms of the Civil Rights
Act. Paul v. Davis, 505 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1974). On certiorari, the Supreme Court
overturned the opinion of the court of appeals. Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the
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distinguished the result in York on the basis of the blatant nature of the
abridgement of personal dignity involved in that case. Notwithstanding
Baker, York remains persuasive authority for the position that the
tortious conduct may be so egregious as to amount to an infringement of
the constitutional right to be free from intrusion.
Two years after York, the Supreme Court decided Griswold v.
Connecticut,2 6 confirming that there is a constitutional right of privacy.
But the Court has extended its holding in Griswold to only a narrow
range of situations involving state interference with the familial, marital,
majority, suggested that acceptance of Davis' contentions would be tantamount to saying
that every legally cognizable injury inflicted by individuals acting under color of law
would constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 698-99. According
to him, this case did not present an instance where a state was trying to remove due
process safeguards necessary for the protection of a constitutional interest; he noted that
there was "no specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding the interest [the respondent]
asserts has been invaded." Id. at 700. Justice Rehnquist held that because the shielding
of an individual's reputation from defamation is not a privilege, right, or immunity se-
cured by the Constitution, the respondent's exclusive remedy would be to sue in a state
court on the basis of state tort law. Id. at 712.
In Paul, the respondent's claim under the Civil Rights Act was essentially one of
libel; his allegation of invasion of privacy was a separate contention with which the
court of appeals never dealt. Therefore, Paul is readily distinguishable from York v.
Story and perhaps from Baker v. Howard. Arguably, to the extent that libel and false
light invasion of privacy overlap, the rationale of Paul may apply to the latter cause
of action. But Paul did not explicitly overrule either York or Baker and its effect on
the holding of these two cases is, at best, conjectural. Nevertheless, in light of Paul,
the lower federal courts will probably be very reluctant to permit a plaintiff to sue for
invasion of privacy under the Civil Rights Act. Whether the holding in Paul will also
curtail the ability of a plaintiff to seek redress in federal courts on the basis of the non-
statutory remedy developed in Bivens is less clear.
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In this case, a Connecticut statute forbade the use of
contraceptives. Under a general criminal law, the executive director and senior medical
director of a local birth control clinic were convicted as accessories for prescribing con-
traceptives to married couples. On appeal, it was contended that the anti-contraceptive
statute violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Douglas argued that penumbral emanations from the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create a "zone of privacy" upon which the states
may not infringe. Id. at 484-85. He concluded that the sanctity of the marital relation-
ship fell within this zone.
Justice Goldberg's concurrence arrived at a similar result by different means. Id.
at 486-99. From the Ninth Amendment he extrapolated a right of marital privacy
which he deemed to be cognate in importance with the other basic guarantees of freedom
of speech, religion, and assembly. This-right, he felt, emanates "'from the totality of
the constitutional scheme under which we live.'" Id. at 494, citing Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The two opinions share crucial defects.
Neither justice takes into account the possibility of potential conflict between the right of
privacy and the broadly-asserted First Amendment guarantee of free speech. More im-
portantly, neither opinion defines the right of privacy said to be implicit in the Constitu-
tion.
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and sexual activities of individuals. 2  It has not linked the Griswold
right of privacy to the rights protected by the modem tort of invasion of
27. The Court relied on Griswold to overrule a conviction for possession of por-
nography. The evidence was obtained in defendant's dwelling by police officers who
entered under the authority of a warrant issued for the purpose of acquiring other evi-
dence unrelated to the offense for which he was convicted. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564-65 (1969). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-67
(1973); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971).
Griswold was also the basis for the Court's decision to uphold a challenge to bur-
densome pregnancy regulations for public school teachers in Cleveland. Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). It was relied upon in the course
of an opinion striking down a Massachusetts law imposing criminal sanctions on the use
of contraceptives by married couples. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
The major recent application of Griswold by the Supreme Court came in its
opinion invalidating a Texas statute that proscribed abortions other than those nec-
essary to save the life of the mother. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). Ac-
cord, Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1974); Hathaway v. Worcester
City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 705-06 (1st Cir. 1973); Doe v. Turner, 361 F. Supp. 1288,
1290 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193, 1199-1200 (D.R.L 1973).
In terms of the protection of the individual's sphere of decision over the sexual as-
pect of his life, the major decision is that of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, which extended the protection of Griswold to consensual sodomy
between a married couple in the privacy of their home. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873,
875 (7th Cir. 1968). Cf. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 624-25 (E.D. Va. 1973);
Raphael v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749, 755 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Towler v. Peyton, 303
F. Supp. 581, 582-83 (W.D. Va. 1969).
But see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d
102 (2d Cir. 1973). In Ravin, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the right of privacy
enunciated in Griswold shielded the petitioner from a criminal prosecution for smoking
marijuana in his own home. 537 P.2d at 498-99. But the basis for the decision may
really be the Alaska Constitution, which recognizes a right of privacy. Id. at 500-01,
504. If so, the precedent set by Ravin may not provide sufficient impetus to extend
Griswold any further than the United States Supreme Court has already done. In In-
graham, the petitioners were patients whose physicians had given them prescriptions for
potentially harmful drugs. They objected to a New York statute requiring that this pre-
scription information be filed in central data banks. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that the complaint should not have been dismissed
because the individual's right to keep private the information contained in his medical
prescriptions was near the continuum of privacy developed by Griswold and Roe v.
Wade, 480 F.2d at 108-09. On remand, a three-judge district court invalidated the state
statute on grounds of overbreadth. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 937 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
The expansive effect of Ingraham may be questioned on several counts. First, both
the court of appeals and the three-judge district court argued that the New York statute
was defective because it failed to provide adequate safeguards for the confidentiality of
the records in question. 480 F.2d at 109, 403 F. Supp. at 937. Second, the precedential
value of these cases may be limited by the fact that they dealt with an aspect of privacy
that Congress had previously attempted to shield by statute. Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964). Finally, at least
one commentator has suggested that the right of "informational privacy" dealt with in
Ingraham is both fundamentally different and clearly distinct from the concept of "indi-
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privacy. 28
In the face of such uncertainty, the lower federal courts have taken
various positions. The conservative approach has best been expressed
by Judge Johnson in his concurrence in Drake v. Covington County
Board of Education,29 a case decided by a three-judge federal court in
Alabama:
This constitutional right of privacy . . is designed to create
a zone of protected activities free from governmental intrusion.
This constitutional right of privacy is very different from the right
of privacy sounding in tort .... This tortious privacy right, often
spoken of as the Warren-Brandeis right of privacy, is a creature
of state law and is not constitutionally based. To the contrary, this
right often comes in conflict with the First Amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech and of the press.30
Similarly, Judge Friendly in Rosenberg v. Martin3 cautioned against
equating the constitutional right of privacy with the statutory rights
protected by the imposition of tort liability in New York.32  Judge
vidual autonomy" discussed in Griswold, so that the former decision cannot properly be
said to be an extension of the latter. See Note, Informational Privacy: Constitutional
Challenges to the Collection and Dissemination of Personal Information by Government
Agencies, 3 HAsTrNGs CONsT. L.Q. 229, 235-36, 245 (1976). Whatever one may think
of this attempted distinction, it is worth noting that Chief Judge Friendly, in his opinion
for the court of appeals in Ingraham, specifically relied on Griswold and Roe v. Wade
to arrive at his conclusion. 480 F.2d at 107-108. For a recent discussion by the Su-
preme Court on this matter, see text accompanying notes 46-50 infra.
A few courts have also intimated that a constitutional right of privacy may protect
homosexuals from governmental interference with their lives solely because of their sex-
ual proclivities. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Acanfora
v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 850-51 (D. Md. 1973); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp.
924, 929 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). These were civil suits. Quite recently, however, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that no right of privacy shielded homosexuals
from prosecution under a state criminal statute for acts of consensual sodomy. Doe v.
Commonwealth's Atty. for City of Richmond, 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976), summarily
aff'g, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). Because this decision was a summary
affirmance of the decision of a three-judge district court, its value as precedent may
be limited. Moreover, in light of the statements in Cotner and Towler, the Court's
action raises troublesome equal protection problems which merit more extended consider-
ation.
28. But cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 415 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
29. 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
30. Id. at 980 (footnotes and citations omitted). See Note, Roe and Paris: Does
Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. Rnv. 1161, 1163 (1974); Rehnquist, Is An Ex-
panded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? Or:
Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1974). See also In
re Long, 55 Cal. App. 3d 788, 794-95, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 735-36 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1976). Long in particular noted the distinction between the tort and constitutional
concepts of privacy, but indicated both concepts are similar in that they shield dignity.
31. 478 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1973).
32. N.Y. CrvwL RIGHTS L&w §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1968).
Spring 19761 THE TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Becker, in Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.,33 a case decided
by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, also
drew the distinction that "the wrongs plaintiff asserts, namely libel
and invasion of privacy, are not normally considered federally guaran-
teed rights."34  In a footnote, he added that the right to have one's
intimate affairs shielded from publicity should always be distinguished
from the constitutional right to be free from unwarranted government
intrusion. These cases evince a strong inclination not to apply Gris-
wold to this area of tort law.
Two other federal courts, however, have adopted a more expansive
approach. The initial case to do so was Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 6
decided by a California district court five years after York. Two Life
magazine reporters visited the plaintiff and managed to gain entry into
his home on the pretext that they were acquaintances of a mutual friend.
While there, they taped his conversation with a hidden recorder and
photographed him with a concealed camera. By prior arrangement, the
tapes and photos were turned over to the Los Angeles District At-
torney's office. The plaintiff was subsequently arrested for practicing
medicine without a license. Two weeks later, Life published an article
that incorporated one of the photos surreptitiously taken and applauded
the district attorney's "crackdown on quackery." Dietemann sued for
invasion of privacy. The district court, relying on Griswold, held:
At the outset defendant is met with the proposition that al-
though freedom of speech and freedom of press are constitutional
guaranties so is the right of privacy. . . While the courts may
be required under some circumstances to balance the rights and
privileges when the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press clash with the right of privacy, there would appear to be
no basis to give greater weight or priority to any one of these con-
stitutional guaranties.37
In addition to finding that the First Amendment right of freedom of
expression did not bar plaintiffs invasion of privacy claim under
California law,3 8 the district court also concluded, on the basis of the
discussion in York of the Civil Rights Act, that a judgment for the
33. 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
34. Id. at 865.
35. Id. at n.5.
36. 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), affd without considering the point, 449
F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
37. Id. at 929. Contra, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 484 F.2d 150,
156 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd without considering the point, 419 U.S. 245 (1974): "If
there are preferred positions among the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
certainly such priority attaches to freedom of speech and the press rather than to the
less explicit and less well defined right of privacy."
38. The court relied on the holding of the California Supreme Court in Gill v. Cur-
tis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
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plaintiff could be predicated on federal law.39 Dietemann, on reflec-
tion, is a revolutionary holding: it declared that privacy and freedom
of expression are rights of comparable importance and should be treated
as such by the courts.
Perhaps the most far-reaching decision on this issue was rendered
by a federal court for the southern district of New York in Galella v.
Onassis.40 This action arose out of the harassing tactics employed by
Ron Galella in photographing Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis. The dis-
trict court, in enjoining Galella, cited Griswold and Dietemann for the
proposition that the Constitution guarantees freedom from intrusive
invasion of privacy.41 The court further stated:
The essence of the privacy interest includes a general "right
to be left alone," and to define one's circle of intimacy; to shield
intimate and personal characteristics and activities from public
gaze; to have moments of freedom from the unremitted assault of
the world and unfettered will of others in order to achieve some
measure of tranquality [sic] for contemplation or other purposes,
without which life loses its sweetness. The rationale extends to
protect against unreasonably intrusive behavior which attempts or
succeeds in. . . gathering, storing, sharing and disseminating of in-
formation by humans and machines.42
Finally, the court seconded the assertion of the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Nader v. General Motors Corp.,43 to the effect that privacy is
cognate in importance with the guarantees of the First Amendment.
Galella, then, goes beyond the statutory right of privacy embodied in
New York law, and at least one New York district court has refused to
apply its conclusions.44
Dietemann and Galella are formative efforts in applying Griswold
to the tort of invasion of privacy, but one should recognize their limita-
tions. Much of what was said was dicta; moreover, Galella and Diete-
39. 284 F. Supp. at 932.
40. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd and modified without considering
the point, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 232. The court in Galella also relied on People v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp.
574 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972). Dicta in Doorley
suggested that the right of privacy was a complex conceptualization based on the First,
Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments and that the fact that the right was
not located in one specific provision did not affect the state's interest in protecting it.
Id. at 577.
42. 353 F. Supp. at 232 (footnotes and citations omitted). Cf. United States v.
Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217, 228 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (right of privacy deemed
to encompass only those rights "traditionally regarded as private in nature").
43. 57 Misc. 2d 301, 292 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Super. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 31 App. Div. 2d
392, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1969), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d
647 (1970).
44. Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 38 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 232 (2d
Cir. 1974).
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mann specifically involve tortious invasion of privacy based on the
theory of intrusion, as did York v. Story. Arguably, however, the logic
of these cases should apply to the false light and public disclosure'of
private facts branches of the tort of invasion of privacy.45
The validity of Dietemann and Galella may have been undercut by
dictum in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis.4 6
The decision in Paul dealt primarily with the respondent's libel claim
under the Civil Rights Act, but Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
noted that Davis had, in his complaint, also alleged an invasion
of his right of privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amend-
ments. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the zones of privacy elabo-
rated upon by the Court in Griswold and in Roe v. Wade47 related to
matters involving procreation, contraception, child-rearing, and educa-
tion.48 He went on to say:
Respondent's claim is far afield from this line of decisions.
His claim is based not upon any challenge to the State's ability to
restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be "private,"
but instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record
of an official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive pri-
vacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and we decline to en-
large them in this manner. 49
Apparently Davis simply sued for violation of privacy in general
and not on the theory of false light invasion of privacy. If so, he was
essentially attempting to recover for an abstract infringement of consti-
tutional rights quite apart from any cause of action he might have had
under modem tort law. Assuming this characterization of Davis' claim
is accurate, Justice Rehnquist's statement can be interpreted very narrow-
ly. Even assuming that Davis did originally allege false light invasion
of privacy, however, -there is no reason to construe Justice Rehnquist's
remarks as relating to any rights other than those protected by that
single branch of the tort of invasion of privacy. Certainly the dictum in
Paul is silent about the nature of the interests protected by a cause of
action for invasion of privacy through public disclosure of private facts.
Yet a third difficulty with this passage is that Justice Rehnquist seems
to be basing his conclusion on the theory that the offending public ac-
tion dealt with a report on a matter of public record to which, by
definition, no right of privacy can pertain.50 If this inference is justi-
45. For definitions of these terms, see note 1 supra.
46. 424 U.S. 693 (1976), revg Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1974).
For the facts of this case, see note 25 supra.
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. 424 U.S. at 713.
49. Id.
50. See notes 253-55 and text accompanying infra. But even if one goes so far
as saying that Paul v. Davis conclusively states that the right of privacy developed in
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fied, then Justice Rehnquist's dictum would be applicable to only a
very limited number of situations. Moreover, it is uncertain what effect
this passage would have on the body of state tort law that permits
recovery for privacy-invading but truthful reportage of matters of public
record. At least it is arguable that the effect of this dictum should be
limited solely to cases like Paul, which involve alleged invasions of
privacy by government officers acting in their official capacity, and
should not be extended to any other situations. The dictum in Paul v.
Davis is therefore not very useful as a guideline for resolving future
cases.
Two directions have been taken by lower federal courts trying to
establish that the tort of invasion of privacy shields constitutional
interests: either the courts have applied Griswold, as in Dietemann
and Galella, or, under a different set of facts, they have invoked a
constitutional sanction embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment and, as
in York v. Story, have recognized a mode of redress in the Civil Rights
Act. Yet a third alternative has been suggested, at least with respect to
invasion of privacy through public disclosure of private facts." The
premise of this alternative is that freedom of expression does not end
with the ability of one person to communicate his thoughts to another;
the interest also embraces a right to control the use to which that other
person puts the communicated information. In order to assure that each
citizen is free to choose how to lead his own life, the state must guaran-
tee him a minimum of privacy; it must allow a minimum of control over
the dissemination of personal information by others. 2 The secret ballot
is an obvious example and the need -for confidentiality -in testimony at
certain types of legislative hearings is another. Strip away the cloaks of
privacy in these situations and people will be reluctant to vote or to
testify, and thus free expression will be diminished. Given this perspec-
tive, the First Amendment may require some protection of individual
privacy; free speech is truly free only if the individual is allowed privacy
Griswold does not include the rights protected by the tort of invasion of privacy, it is
arguable that the court should expand Griswold in just such a way. If one admits that
shielding the intimate facts of a person's life or penalizing the publication of facts that
present a person in a false light in the public eye fall within the ambit of privacy, then
why shouldn't these interests receive as much protection as the interest in protecting a
person from state intrusion into the sexual, marital, or familial aspects of his life? Why
acknowledge constitutional underpinnings for a cause of action for invasion of privacy
through intrusion and not extend the same safeguards to the other branches of the tort?
Paul v. Davis fails to address this problem; but even if Justice Rehnquist's comments
are broadly construed, they need not result in any retreat from the cautious case-by-case
balancing the Court has elsewhere sought to apply in invasion of privacy cases. See
notes 258-59 infra.
51. See Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973).
52. Id. at 1465-67.
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in choosing what he wishes to express. Perhaps the major insight to be
derived from this viewpoint is that freedom of expression and privacy
are not competing interests but essentially complementary interests. As
the advocate of this third alternative suggests, the courts have not
recognized this fact.53  Perhaps this is to be expected because the
Supreme Court and most of the lower federal courts have been operating
on the theory that these two interests conflict; that every extension of the
right of privacy in a tort context becomes another encroachment on the
preserve of free speech and free press.
The key point is that once one agrees that the former right is
constitutional in nature and equivalent in importance to the latter, the
application of any test limiting the ability of the plaintiff to recover
damages for invasion of privacy would appear to be wrong. Rather, as
Justice Harlan suggested in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,4 the
body of local law protecting the right of privacy must be considered in
light of the underlying state interest in affording such protection.
II. The Constitutional Privilege and its Ramifications:
The Evolution of the Actual Malice Test
A. Origins
In order to determine what limits have been placed upon the
plaintiff's ability to recover for tortious invasion of privacy, it is neces-
sary to consider a number of libel cases where those limitations were
initially created and defined.
The actual malice test was first enunciated in the landmark case of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.55 That case involved a suit by a city
commissioner brought against The New York Times, which published
an allegedly libelous (and partially false) advertisement castigating the
way police in Montgomery, Alabama had dealt with a racial incident.
The Supreme Court, reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, held that a
public official could recover for libel only upon a showing that the
defendant published defamatory statements with actual malice, that is,
either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their
possible falsity.58 Under the common law of the states, there had
53. Id. at 1464. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 714-15 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
54. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. Id. at 279-80. Prosser dislikes the use of the term "malice" and would substi-
tute for it the word "scienter." PROSSER, supra note 1, § 118 at 821. This is a valu-
able suggestion. The Supreme Court took pains to distinguish actual malice from ill-
will or animosity. See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967);
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78-79
(1964). But a decade later courts are still confusing common-law malice with actual mal-
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traditionally been a circumscribed privilege of fair comment about the
activities of public servants, 57 but for over seventy years the federal
courts had recognized the axiom that this privilege did not extend to the
publication of falsehoods. 58 The Court in New York Times did not
discredit this axiom; it merely exempted from tort liability innocent and
negligent publishers of untruths.
The Court offered several justifications for its position. It ad-
vanced the theory that ad hominem criticism is a foreseeable risk that
public servants must accept as a condition of their chosen careers. 59 The
Court gave equal weight to the necessity for safeguarding the vitality of
debate upon public issues and the concomitant need to give free expres-
sion breathing space. It expressed the fear that exorbitant awards of
damages would have a chilling effect upon free speech. Moreover, it
doubted whether First Amendment freedoms could survive under the
pall of timidity imposed by the threat of lawsuits brought by libel
victims.60 The final justification offered by the majority in the New
York Times case was that the difficulty and expense of verifying the
truth of all assertions published would deter criticism and comment
from being publicly aired. This argument was more fully elaborated by
Judge J. Skelly Wright in Washington Post Co. v. Keogh,6' where he
noted:
Verification . . . is a time-consuming process, a factor especially
significant in the newspaper business where news quickly goes
stale, commentary rapidly becomes irrelevant, and commercial op-
portunity. . . can easily be lost. In many instances considerations
of time . . . make verification impossible . . . Verification is
also a costly process, and the newspaper business is one in which
economic survival has become a major problem, made increasingly
grave by the implications of this fact for free debate. We should
be hesitant to impose responsibilities upon newspapers which can
ice. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974).
But cf. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 342 (2d Cir. 1969). This last opinion ar-
gued that evidence of ill-will "may be adduced for the purpose of establishing, by cumu-
lation and by appropriate inferences, the fact of a defendant's recklessness or of his
knowledge of falsity."
The confusion is compounded when one remembers that the actual malice test is
a minimum evidentiary burden on which the right of recovery is conditioned. Presum-
ably New York Times would not preclude a state from requiring that, in order to re-
ceive punitive damages in a libel or invasion of privacy suit, the plaintiff must first prove
actual malice and common-law malice.
57. See PRossER, supra note 1, § 118 at 819-20.
58. Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 539-41 (6th Cir. 1893).
59. See note 86 infra.
60. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964). But see Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
61. 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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be met only through costly procedures or through self-censorship
designed to avoid the risks of publishing controversial material. 2
B. Clarifications
The New York Times decision left many questions unanswered.
Before subsequent courts could adequately apply the actual malice test,
they first had to clarify exactly what the test entailed. The Court in
New York Times spoke of the plaintiff's burden of making a "clear and
convincing" showing of the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard
of falsity."3 That part of the actual malice test conditioning liability on
62. Id. at 972. The opinion also noted that the New York Times rule applies re-
gardless of whether the publication complained of is a paid advertisement or an editorial.
Id. at 970 n.6. Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
499 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 1974).
63. 376 U.S. at 285-86. Subsequent Supreme Court opinions repeat the "clear and
convincing" requirement. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). Of course, as noted
in Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1975), this burden
of proof is heavier than the usual "preponderance of the evidence" requirement in civil
cases. But cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 50.
At this juncture, it is useful to consider the procedural problems that arise when
a defendant asserting constitutional privilege moves for a summary judgment or directed
verdict. The consensus of the federal courts is that a bare allegation of actual malice
by the plaintiff, supported only by a hope that cross-examination will impair the credibil-
ity of the defendant's witnesses, is insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judg-
ment. Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1335 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Goldman
v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133, 139 (N.D. Ca. 1971); Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 312
F. Supp. 848, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp.
967, 973-74 (D. Minn. 1967). What the courts do require is a showing by the plaintiff
that he has "sufficient probative substance to be able litigably to give rise to an issue
of fact on whether [actual] malice . . . existed or not." United Medical Laboratories,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706, 712 (9th Cir. 1968). Accord,
Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1971); Time, Inc. v. McLaney,
406 F.2d 565, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1969); Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394
F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
But a problem arises when one characterizes the issue of actual malice as a matter
of constitutional fact. Because the very need to defend a lawsuit has a chilling effect
on free speech, the First Amendment would seem to require the granting of a summary
judgment or directed verdict whenever the plaintiff makes a doubtful showing. See
Time, Inc. v. McLaney, supra at 566; Spern v. Time, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1201, 1204
(W.D. Pa. 1971).
To meet this problem, Judge J. Skelly Wright has suggested a three-step procedure.
First, use the usual method in deciding whether or not to grant a summary judgment.
If the plaintiff withstands that challenge, let the trial court entertain a motion for a di-
rected verdict after the plaintiff has fully presented his case, and if the trial proceeds,
reserve the same motion for reconsideration after the defendant has introduced all his
evidence. Should the plaintiff's case survive this challenge, let the issues go to the jury
without informing them that the presiding judge has found actual malice. At each junc-
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the knowing publication of a lie is self-explanatory; but the term "reck-
less disregard" both required and received further elaboration.
ture, the trial judge makes an independent assessment of both the credibility of the plain-
tiff's witnesses or affidavits and the inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.
See Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright, J., concur-
ring). Under this procedure, the plaintiff is compelled to meet his burden of clear and
convincing proof at every stage of the trial; if at any point he fails to meet this burden,
the proceeding is ended and the expense and inconvenience incurred by the defendant
is thereby minimized. The obvious advantage of this procedure is that it provides the
trial court with a sufficiently precise methodological approach to follow. Perhaps for
this reason, Judge Wright's model has been explicitly adopted by the Fifth Circuit and
by a few other district courts. See Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858,
864-65 (5th Cir. 1970); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1205 (D.D.C.
1975); Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., supra at 1335. In a recent case the Seventh Circuit
has also given cautious approval to Judge Wright's technique, with certain reservations
that arose from the limits of the factual situation with which it dealt. Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 210, 213 n.15 (7th Cir. 1976). It is impossible to say how
many other jurisdictions have implicitly adopted this model.
But there are serious deficiencies in Judge Wright's approach. First, it may conflict
with state laws requiring mixed questions of law and fact in invasion of privacy or libel
cases to be submitted to the jury for determination. See Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir. 1973). Another objection relates to one consequence
of designating an issue to be a matter of constitutional fact. If such a designation is
made then the appellate court is usually bound to make an independent de novo review
of the record. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964). When summary judgment is granted too
quickly appellate courts have very little record to review. Unless the evidence is fully
developed, appellate courts cannot fulfill their duty to assess independently issues of con-
stitutional fact. For this reason, two cases in the Third Circuit reversed summary judg-
ments with instructions to let the trial proceed so that the issues involved could be ade-
quately aired, regardless of the chilling effect upon the defendant. See Taggart v. Wad-
leigh-Maurice, Ltd., supra at 438-39. Accord, Gordon v. Random House, Inc., 486 F.2d
1356, 1360-61 (3d Cir. 1973).
There is yet a third objection to Judge Wright's approach. His model would re-
quire the presiding trial judge, upon the defendant's motion for summary judgment or
directed verdict, to make his own assessment of and draw his own inferences from the
plaintiff's presentation of evidence. But the standard procedure in civil law suits in fed-
eral courts is to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion rather than to choose among the many inferences presented by the facts. See
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (both with respect to summary judgment); Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943) (with respect to directed verdicts). On this
theory, two cases decided in the Ninth Circuit have repudiated Judge Wright's approach.
See Teachers Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441-43 (9th Cir. 1974). Accord,
Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 519 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1975). See also
Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The premise
of these cases is that the presence of threatened First Amendment interests does not af-
ford a basis for adopting procedures that inordinately discriminate against the plaintiff
who seeks to submit his case to a jury; whether this premise is justified is a debatable
proposition.
Two generalizations can be made. First, the granting of summary judgment in def-
amation and privacy cases is the rule, not the exception. Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec.
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In Garrison v. Louisiana," the phrase was defined as a "high
degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity."65  This case involved
a statement by Garrison accusing. members of the state judiciary of lazi-
ness and corruption. The Supreme Court reversed Garrison's conviction
under Louisiana's criminal libel statute. It reiterated that mere negli-
gence alone is an insufficient basis for imposing liability, thus implying
that reckless disregard is allied to the concept of gross negligence. The
connection between the two was drawn again three years later in the
plurality opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,66 in which Justice
Harlan defined reckless disregard as being "highly unreasonable con-
duct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investiga-
tion and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. 67
Under this definition, the courts are to look at the degree of negligence
exhibited by the publisher in the context of the standards of his profes-
sion and, if his lapse of due care is sufficiently egregious, then liability
should be imposed."'
In 196.8 the Court, in St. Amant v. Thompson, " gave full consid-
eration to the subject of reckless disregard. In St. Amant the defend-
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Accord, Treutler v. Meredith
Corp., 455 F.2d 255, 257 n.1 (8th Cir. 1972); Alexander v. Lancaster, 330 F. Supp.
341, 350 (W.D. La. 1971). But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, the federal rules of procedure do not indicate
how to determine whether an issue of fact exists. Therefore, while the trial judge should
not decide issues of fact, he should scan the evidence supporting the plaintiffs allega-
tions in order to determine whether or not that evidence establishes a cause of action.
Cf. Ashwell & Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 407 F.2d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 1969). See
also (with respect to the duty of fact-finding in state court proceedings) Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, supra at 969.
64. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
65. Id. at 74.
66. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
67. Id. at 158. One district court has claimed that Justice Harlan's opinion ex-
pressed the view of a majority of the Court. Buckley v. Vidal, 50 F.R.D. 271, 273 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). This is erroneous. The opinions of the five concurring justices
(Warren, C.J., and Black, Douglas, Brennan, and White, JJ.) suggest that they would
apply the actual malice test to both public officials and public figures, without regard
to any showing of "highly unreasonable conduct." 388 U.S. at 163 (Warren, CJ., con-
curring, joined by Brennan and White, JJ.); id. at 170 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concur-
ring).
68. But cf. PRossER, supra note 1, § 34 at 181-82, to the effect that the concept
of "degrees" of negligence is a fallacy and that what the courts really mean to say is
that differing circumstances require more or less due care. At least one federal court
of appeals has implicitly accepted Prosser's approach in these First Amendment cases
by stating that "hot news" items may require more stringent pre-publication investigative
standards than other stories. Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378, 380 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024,
1026 (5th Cir. 1975).
69. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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ant, in the course of a political broadcast, accused the plaintiff, a sheriff,
of criminal conduct. The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which had affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiff. Recognizing that the term "reckless disregard" was not sus-
ceptible of one exact, unchanging definition, Justice White concluded
that publication with serious doubts about the truth of the matter
published is the key in determining whether reckless disregard under the.
actual malice test has been proven.7 0  He went on to discuss the types of
evidence sufficient to impeach a defendant's declaration that he pub-
lished in good faith, and pointed out that professions of good faith
would be unpersuasive where a story is based on: (a) fabrications
concocted by the publisher, (b) an unverified, anonymous telephone call,
(c) allegations so inherently improbable that no reasonable man would
publicize them, or (d) statements elicited from an informant whose lack
of veracity is obvious.7 1  This summary is not entirely helpful. Fabri-
cated stories fall under the rubric of knowing falsity and shed little light
on reckless disregard. A story based solely on an anonymous telephone
call is a rarity that most courts will never confront. "Inherently improb-
able allegations" is perhaps too vague a formulation to be helpful except
in the most obvious cases. "Veracity of informants" is a useful criterion,
but where the identity of the informants is confidential, the plaintiff may
often be unable to convince a judge to require that the defendants
disclose their names.7 Moreover, even under these criteria, the courts
will not impose liability in cases involving instances of rhetorical hyper-
bole. 78
70. Id. at 731.
71. Id. at 732.
72. Compare Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 637-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) with Cer-
vantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 991-93 (8th Cir. 1972). The gist of the two cases
seems to be that a summary judgment for a defendant may not be granted unless plaintiff
can cross-examine defendant's informants (confidential or otherwise), provided a plain-
tiff can show such cross-examination will have a direct bearing upon the issue of consti-
tutional malice. The problem with this rationale is that often a plaintiff does not know
in advance if the cross-examination of the informants will be relevant to the issue of
malice. If the veracity of an informant is a crucial factor, the plaintiff cannot impeach
the trustworthiness of the defendant's sources unless and until the defendant is made to
disclose the identity of those sources. The determinative factor is apparently going to
be whether the strength of the plaintiff's case in all other respects justifies the court's
decision to break the bond of confidentiality.
73. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970)
(report of accusation of "blackmail" against plaintiff in public debate although accuser
merely meant plaintiff was applying high-pressure tactics against a municipal council).
Accord, Lambert v. Providence Journal Co., 508 F.2d 656, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1975) (pub-
lication of article characterizing as a "murder victim" the person plaintiff was accused of
killing); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 384-85 (4th Cir. 1971) (statement that
plaintiff was "destroyed" in a basketball game by the brilliant play of Bill Russell); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1966) (statement that highway
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C. Practical Application
It is interesting to consider the types of conduct by the defendant
involved in those cases in which a plaintiff has succeeded in showing
actual malice. As the following chronological procession of decisions
suggests, the differences between knowledge and reckless disregard are
perhaps clearcut in theory but nebulous in practice.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,74 the Saturday Evening Post
published an article falsely accusing Butts of conspiring to fix a
football game. This information was received from one Burnett who
claimed to have overheard Butts conversing by telephone with the coach
of the other team in question. Burnett was on probation for passing
bad checks, so his trustworthiness was dubious. The reporters who
wrote the article were not conversant with the game or they would have
known that the information Butts allegedly divulged during the tele-
phone conversation was valueless. No attempt was made to contact
other witnesses or to review videotapes of the game in question; in fact,
due to other demands, the article writer's research assistants did almost
no subsidiary investigation. On these facts, the Supreme Court af-
firmed a verdict for the plaintiff.
In Goldwater v. Ginzburg,75 the defendant published a magazine
named Fact, one issue (published in 1964) of which was devoted to
Barry Goldwater and his psychological unfitness for the presidency.
patrolman was a "bastard"); Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1327 (W.D.
Pa. 1974) (statement that plaintiff's property was "adjacent to" a proposed construction
site when it was actually a nearby, but not contiguous, plot). See also Buckley v. Lit-
tell, 394 F. Supp. 918, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd in part, 539 F.2d 882, 893 (2d Cir.
1976). In this case the district court had held that hyperbole ("fascist," "fellow trav-
eler") conveying a false representation may be actionable. The Second Circuit held that
due to the inherent imprecision of such terms in the realm of political debate, the use
of them cannot be deemed libelous.
Analogous to this problem is that encountered when the media report on official
documents that may contain hyperbole or ambiguous rhetoric. See Time, Inc. v. Pape,
401 U.S. 279 (1971). In an article by the Civil Rights Commission that summarized
a report on police brutality, Time quoted an illustrative episode mentioned in the report,
saying that Pape and others had assaulted blacks. As a matter of fact, the Commission's
report only printed an allegation that Pape had done so. Pape recovered for libel but
the Supreme Court reversed, saying that the Commission's account of the incident was
ambiguous and Time staffers could reasonably conclude that the authors of the report
believed that the incident in question had actually occurred; in such circumstances, the
Court found that Time was guilty only of an error of judgment. Id. at 292. The hold-
ing of this case may be limited to the specific facts involved; at least one subsequent
decision by the Court seems to undercut drastically the value of Pape as a precedent.
See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 n.4 (1976). But see id. at 470 (Powell,
J., concurring). Justice Powell repeats the rationale of Pape but fails to mention the
earlier case specifically.
74. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
75. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1969).
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Judge Sterry R. Waterman, in his lengthy opinion for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, found numerous instances of
bias and bad faith on the part of Ginzburg. A claim that Goldwater had
nervous breakdowns was based on the uncorroborated affidavit of only
one informant. The defendant Ginzburg quoted the words of others,
although the statements made in those quotations were patently improb-
able. Still other quotations were selectively edited in such a way as to
distort their meaning. The central feature of the issue was a poll of
psychiatrists purportedly showing that the medical community deemed
Goldwater to be mentally unstable, and its validity was impeached not
only by the expert testimony of Elmo Roper and the American Medical
Association, but also by a demonstration that the responses of the
psychiatrists solicited had been altered to produce misleading results.
The court affirmed a verdict against Ginzburg on the theory that there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a preconceived
plan to malign Goldwater's character.7 6
In Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,77
another libel suit, the defendant published an accusation by one Higgs
that the plaintiff, a non-profit organization involved in ecology and
medicine, was secretly funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. Sub-
sequently, the editor-in-chief checked with his friend Richard Helms, the
C.I.A. director. Helms called the accusation a lie. The following day,
the story was repeated with further details about the purported inconsis-
tency between the Airlie Foundation's income and its expenditures; the
article said that the C.I.A. had declined to comment on the accusation
by Higgs but noted that other, unidentified government sources disputed
the charge. Relying on Goldwater and St. Amant, the district court in
the District of Columbia upheld a verdict for the plaintiff.
Finally, in Davis v. Schuchat,71 an investigative reporter in the
course of researching an article told one of Schuchat's colleagues that
Schuchat had once been convicted of criminal fraud in an insurance
case. He had in fact been indicted for such an offense, but was
subsequently acquitted, and he brought suit alleging slander per se.
Davis argued that in reading articles on the subject he had mistakenly
assumed that Schuchat had been convicted because he had apparently
confused him with another. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that in light of Davis' knowledge of the case
in question, and his evasive answers during cross-examination at trial,
he could be found to have harbored substantial doubts about the truth
of his assertion.
76. Id. at 337.
77. 337 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1972).
78. 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Compare Davis with Buckley v. Littell, 394
F. Supp. 918, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir.
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In Goldwater, Airlie, and Davis the conduct of the defendants,
while characterized as involving reckless disregard, really involved ele-
ments of publication with scienter. In Butts, this aspect was lacking but
there the Court found no compliance with minimal standards of verifica-
tion. This suggests that the courts are unlikely to impose liability for
recklessness unless such recklessness is either (a) tied to a component of
knowledge of falsity which is (or should be) the source of the "serious
doubts" referred to in St. Amant, or (b) tied to total or nearly total
failure to corroborate or verify, when such verification is neither inordi-
nately difficult nor precluded by time constraints, as in the case of "hot
news." Alleging reckless disregard would thus seem to be futile unless
the plaintiff could prove that the defendant was guilty either of nonfeas-
ance, where he had both a duty and an opportunity to act, or of
misfeasance, where he discovered facts that should have put him on his
guard as to the falsity of an assertion, but took affirmative action either
to conceal those facts or to distort the meaning or the logical implica-
tions to be derived from them.
While the New York Times rule clearly constricted the capacity of
the plaintiff to vindicate his personal interest by litigation, the Supreme
Court changed its position in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 79 In Gertz,
the plaintiff was a private attorney involved in a civil suit against a
policeman convicted of killing a youth. The defendant's magazine, a
publication of the John Birch Society, alleged that Gertz was part of a
communist conspiracy to discredit the police. In the ensuing libel
action, the trial court entered a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant and
the court of appeals affirmed this ruling. The Supreme Court reversed.
In doing so, it enunciated a dual standard. Plaintiffs who are public
officials or public figures are still confronted with the burden of proving
actual malice; private individuals, however, may benefit from any other
appropriate standard of liability promulgated by the states, short of
liability without fault. In other words, under Gertz the private-party
plaintiff may sue for negligent publication of defamatory falsehoods.8 0
Ill. The Actual Malice Test:
Against Whom Will It Apply?
A. Status Analysis and Interest Analysis with Respect to the Plaintiff
1. Early Developments: from New York Times to Rosenbloom.
A crucial problem of constitutional privilege concerns those who
might be precluded from recovering damages if no malice is found to
1976) (held that evidence of the discrepancy between what an author privately believes
and what he publicly writes is sufficient to establish actual malice).
79. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
80. Id. at 347-50. Accord, Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830,
833 (8th Cir. 1974).
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exist. The federal courts have addressed this problem in two ways. One
approach has focused on the status of the plaintiff. Under this theory, a
public official or public figure would have to meet the burden of
proving actual malice whereas a plaintiff deemed to be a private person
would not. The second approach considers whether or not the plain-
tiff has become involved with a matter of public concern, thereby losing
his anonymity, and, by implication, his privacy. Beginning with Time,
Inc. v. Hill,8 these two approaches merge, at least with respect to the
plaintiff who claims he is a private person rather than a public figure. In
such instances, the courts use the public interest analysis approach as a
way of determining the plaintiff's status.
The majority opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 2 express-
ly limited the application of the actual malice test to instances of libel
against public officials.83 In a footnote, the Court indicated that it was
not determining which classes of civil servants were public officials for
the purpose of this test; nor was it willing to delineate the parameters of
official conduct.8 4 The Court justified its posture primarily on the
theory that an award of damages for the innocent or negligent publica-
tion of defamatory falsehoods would have a detrimental effect upon the
climate of robust debate protected by the First Amendment. 85  Addi-
tionally, it suggested that public officials, by reason of their status, must
be able to weather harsh criticism, and "thrive in a hardy climate."8 6 It
is important to recognize that the New York Times decision is a narrow
one and is plausible because of that very narrowness. Its status analysis
approach placed the burden of proving actual malice only on those
plaintiffs who were also public officials.
The next decision in this area came in 1966 in Rosenblatt v.
Baer,8 7 a libel suit brought by a former civil servant against the author
of an article that accused him of embezzlement while he had held office
81. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
82. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
83. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
84. 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
85. Id. at 270.
86. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947), cited in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273. The most compelling statement of this rationale is as follows:
"Men in public life, whether they be judges, legislators, executives or scientists, must ac-
cept as an incident of their service harsh criticism, ofttimes unfair and unjustified-at
times false and defamatory-and this is particularly so when their activities or perform-
ance may be the subject of differing attitudes and stir deep controversy. While it is
not pleasant to be the target of false and defamatory charges, officials must be 'able
to thrive in a hardy climate,' and their personal injury and hurt must yield to the higher
purpose of assuring citizens freedom of expression. Dissent and the right to criticize
those in public life are of the essence of the democratic process." Adey v. United Ac-
tion for Animals, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (footnotes omitted).
87. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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as director of a community recreation facility. In Rosenblatt the
Supreme Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion carefully filled in some of the gaps inherent in
the status analysis approach taken in the New York Times decision. He
defined public officials as "those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial respon-
sibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. '8
Again, this decision dealt solely with the problem of public position;
nevertheless, in talking about apparent importance or responsibility, the
Supreme Court articulated a subjective and hence elastic test for deter-
mining who is a public official within the meaning of New York Times.
A year after Rosenblatt, the Court decided Time, Inc. v. Hill. 9
This case involved a Life magazine article about the dramatization of a
novel inspired by the ordeal of the Hills, who had been held captive in
their home by a trio of escaped convicts several years earlier. The
article suggested that the play duplicated the Hills' actual experience,
though in fact it did not. Hill sued in the New York courts under that
state's statute protecting the individual's right of privacy. 90 A judgment
for Hill and an award of compensatory damages was set aside by the
Supreme Court. The Court noted the position taken in an earlier case
by the Court of Appeals of New York to the effect that the New York
Times rule did not apply to instances involving fictionalized, unauthor-
ized biographies of celebrities who are not public officials. 91 The
Court disagreed with the stance adopted by Judge Keating in that
opinion, and held that the New York Times rule also applied to privacy
actions brought to compensate for the harm caused by false reports of
matters of public interest.92 Because the public had an interest in
learning about a new play opening on Broadway, Hill was denied an
award of damages unless he could prove actual malice. The Court
qualified its holding by pointing out that it did not decide whether the
same standard should be applicable to persons both voluntarily and
involuntarily thrust into the limelight, because that question was not
before it.93
88. Id. at 85. Compare Rosenblatt with Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 193
(D.D.C. 1965) (held that the New York Times rule applies only to "high-ranking" pub-
lic officials).
89. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
90. Hill v. Hayes, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1963), aff'd,
15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7, amended, 16 N.Y.2d 658, 209
N.E.2d 282, 261 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1965).
91. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d
877 (1966).
92. 385 U.S. at 388.
93. Id. at 391.
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The use of the public interest analysis approach in Time, Inc. v.
Hill offered an alternative to the status analysis approach the Court
undertook in New York Times. But in many ways the matter of the
public interest test is problematic. The public interest privilege as a
defense to actions for invasion of privacy did not originate with the
Court but was borrowed from the common law of the states.9 4  Al-
though Time, Inc. v. Hill does introduce a novel element to the privilege
by shielding those who negligently or innocently publish misstatements
of fact, the public interest analysis approach is still inadequate because
of its vagueness and overbreadth. Conceivably, the privilege can cover
any item likely to arouse public attention.15 Consequently, the problem
becomes not what is included within the test but rather what is not
excluded. The term "matters of public interest" is so elusive that it
permits the courts to extend the privilege to cover both matters of
legitimate public concern and matters of interest to the public merely for
their entertainment value. 6 Moreover, the rule of Time, Inc. v. Hill
significantly erodes the concept of a private plaintiff. Hill was a private
person who had once involuntarily become involved in an incident that
caught the public's eye; he had, in effect, once been a public figure.
Because of that one involvement, the Court believed he had forfeited his
right of privacy; the experiences of Hill had been "matters of public
concern" and accordingly were deemed fair game for subsequent publi-
cization. Essentially, Time, Inc. v. Hill brings the public figure, the
temporary celebrity, within the purview of the New York Times rule.97
The doctrine inherent in Time, Inc. v. Hill was carried back into
the area of libel the same year by the Court's decision in Curtis Publish-
ing Co..v. Butts."8 Butts held that one who is a public figure, one who
94. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958); Rozhon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 230 F.2d 359, 361
(7th Cir. 1956); Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974, 976-77 (3d Cir.
1951); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940); Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 251, 253
(W.D. La. 1962); Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 544-45 (D.
Conn. 1953); Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y.
1951). See also PROSSER, supra note 1, § 118 at 824-26; Warren & Brandeis, The
Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 214 (1890).
95. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
96. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958): "In brief,
once the character of an item as news is established, it is neither feasible nor desirable
for a court to make a distinction between news for information and news for entertain-
ment in determining the extent to which publication is privileged." Cf. Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
97. Accord, Davis v. National Broadcasting Co., 320 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (E.D.
La. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1971).
98. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). This development was prefigured in Pauling v. Globe-
Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909
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both commands continuing public interest and has sufficient media
access to counteract the effects of a defamatory publication, could
recover damages for libel only upon proof of actual malice.9
The plurality opinion in Butts was, in some ways, an accurate
forecast of things to come. It defined public figures as including those
who thrust themselves into the midst of public questions or controver-
sies, thus inviting widespread attention. 00 As a result, the public
interest analysis involved in Time, Inc. v. Hill became a determinant of
the status of the plaintiff for the purposes of applying the actual malice
test. 1' At least one of the concurring opinions explicitly agreed with
this step,102 but the bewildering maze of different opinions in the case
probably obscured widespread recognition of the innovative step the
Court took.
The lower federal courts seized upon the interest analysis explicit in
Time, Inc. v. Hill and implicit in Butts. The leading case in this regard
was United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc.,103 a suit brought by a mail order testing laboratory against
CBS for general comments made during various radio and television
broadcasts about the inaccurate clinical testing conducted by such labora-
tories. In affirming the trial court's entry of a summary judgment for
the defendant, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held:
(1967), which applied the New York Times rule to defamatory comments about "private
citizens who seek to lead in the determination of national policy." Accord, Pauling v.
News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964).
99. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155. For a discussion of the net
effect the Butts decision had on the expansion of the scope of the actual malice test, see
note 67 and text accompanying supra. Prosser defines "public figure" as "a person who,
by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character,
has become a 'public personage.'" PRossER, supra note 1, § 118 at 823. Prosser's def-
inition is too restrictive in at least one respect; not only persons but also institutions
can become "public figures." University of the South v. Berkley Publishing Corp., 392
F. Supp. 32, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But even though an institution may be classified as a
public or private figure for the purpose of determining liability in a libel suit, there is
extensive authority to the effect that only natural persons, and not institutions, have a
cause of action fdr tortious invasion of privacy. See United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982, 985
(W.D. Mo. 1912); Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93, 95 (S.D.
W. Va. 1968); Oasis Nite Club, Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D. Md.
1966).
100. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155.
101. But cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1967), where Justice Bren-
nan suggested that the decision in that case did not deal with the issues involved in libel
per quod cases arising from publication of matters of public concern. This valuable sug-
gestion unfortunately has been ignored.
102. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, J., concurring).
103. 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
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If the publications here are within the field of First Amendment
protection at all as against the consequences of state libel law, the
area of public interest to which they relate-conditions allegedly
capable of wide-spreadedly affecting public health-would seem to
us to be one of such inherent public concern and stake that there
could be no possible question as to the applicability of the New
York Times standard for any defeasance. 104
The court limited its ruling to matters of legitimate general interest. 10 5
In other words, the discussion centered on news as information, not
news as entertainment. By stressing the legitimacy of the public's
concern, the court retrenched slightly from the broad assertions prof-
fered in Time, Inc. v. Hill.10 6
The public concern/general interest rationale either explicitly
or implicitly underlies the holdings in a number of later decisions.
Subsequent courts have directly or indirectly relied on the conclusions of
United Labs in characterizing as items of legitimate public interest the
activities of organized crime,10 7 the gradual dilapidation of a hotel open
only during the Masters Tournament,0 8 sports and sports figures, 0 9
credit ratings,"10 and the activities of churches and ministers."' The
import of United Labs and its progeny was that the lower federal courts
would examine the nature of the publicity-causing occurrence and the
104. Id. at 711.
105. Id.
106. This emphasis on the nature of the event rather than on the status of the plain-
tiff as being a key factor in libel suits prefigured the view adopted three years later by
the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See note 126
and text accompanying infra.
107. Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 464 F.2d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1972); Time, Inc. v. Mc-
Laney, 406 F.2d 565, 573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); LaBruzzo
v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Konigsberg v. Time, Inc.,
312 F. Supp. 848, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Blanke v. Time, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 378, 379-
80 (E.D. La. 1970); Holmes v. Curtis Publishing Co., 303 F. Supp. 522, 526 (D.S.C.
1969); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aII'd, 449 F.2d
306 (9th Cir. 1971); Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 302 F. Supp. 1005, 1006-07 (M.D. Fla.
1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970); Arizona Biochem. Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302
F. Supp. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But cf. Harkaway v. Boston Herald Traveler Corp.,
418 F.2d 56, 58-59 (1st Cir. 1969).
108. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704, 706-07 (S.D. Ga. 1969),
afj'd, 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
109. Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 382-83 (4th Cir. 1971); Sellers v. Time,
Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582, 584-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1970).
110. Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1383-84 (7th Cir. 1972);
Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 170, 177-78 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Grove v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1068, 1070-71 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
111. Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1050, 1051
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Church of Scientology of California v. Dell Publishing Co., 362 F.
'Supp. 767, 769 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Spern v. Time, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (W.D.
Pa. 1971).
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right of the public to learn about it rather than the status of the plaintiff.
But by defining the applicable criterion in terms of the public's "right to
know," the courts assume that if the public has no legitimate concern in
being informed about some subject, then perhaps the constitutional
privilege may not be asserted by the potential defendant. The line
might be drawn between news stories intended to inform and those
intended merely to titillate or to amuse. The courts have not made this
distinction, no doubt in deference to Time, Inc. v. Hill, and at least five
decisions have applied the United Labs rationale to publications that
were designed primarily to entertain." 2  Nevertheless, the refinement
made by the United Labs case on Time, Inc. v. Hill did raise some
issues that merit more discussion than they have yet received.
Several of the lower federal courts have, however, adopted a more
pragmatic approach to the subject of newsworthiness and the public
interest. In doing so, they have offered specific, concrete guidelines for
determining when a publication is newsworthy. This effort is important
because it provides an objective means of applying the public interest
criterion. The first court to adopt this stance was a district court in
California in Goldman v. Time, Inc. 1 3  This case involved a Life
magazine article depicting plaintiff and others as part of a "restless
generation" of American youth roaming abroad. The plaintiff initiated
a suit for false light invasion of privacy, and the district court granted
defendant's motion for a summary judgment. The court recognized the
public interest to be an elusive and expansive concept, 114 and in deter-
mining how to reconcile the concept with the individual's interest in
privacy the court relied on the tripartite criteria devised by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court. 1 5 Under this approach, newsworthiness is deter-
mined by weighing several factors, including (1) the social value of the
facts published, (2) the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly
private affairs, and (3) the extent to which the party voluntarily acced-
112. Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice, Ltd., 489 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1973) (inclu-
sion of unauthorized footage depicting plaintiff in a documentary film about a music
festival); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1972) (article detailing
the tactics used By a party to gain evidence in a divorce suit); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406
F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (publication of a photo depicting an exuberant foot-
ball fan with an unzipped fly); Man v. Warner Bros. Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50, 52 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (fact situation similar to that in Taggart); Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp.
582, 584-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (report about a law suit pending against a golfer who hit
a golf ball backwards into his partner's eye). But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.s.
448, 453-54 (1976); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128-29, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975).
113. 336 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
114. Id. at 138.
115. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 42-43,
93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874-75 (1971). Accord, Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 36, 459
P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1969).
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ed to a position of public notoriety. 116 The court declared that it was
well aware of the power of the public media to bring virtually any
person and even the most insignificant event into the ambit of news, but
concluded that under this weighing-of-factors approach, the subject
matter of the article was sufficiently newsworthy to require application
of the New York Times rule.117
The balancing approach adopted in Goldman is a valuable device;
it explicitly outlines those considerations which the courts should exam-
ine in determining what is an event of public interest. Unlike Justice
Brennan's opinion in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Goldman technique pro-
vides objective criteria for deciding cases on the basis of something other
than the subjective responses of individual judges. Some courts had
wrestled implicitly with similar determinants," 8 but Goldman was the
first case to adopt the explicit guidelines the federal courts had been so
desperately lacking. The analysis of Goldman has been adopted in at
least two other jurisdictions,"19 but general acceptance has, at least to
date, not been forthcoming.
During this period the Supreme Court was not concerned with
refining the public interest analysis approach by enunciating more objec-
tive criteria. In 1971 the Court used straight status analysis to decide
two cases that extended the New York Times rule. Monitor Patriot Co.
v. Roy' 120 involved an article printed in the Concord Monitor accusing a
senatorial candidate of being a former petty bootlegger. In reversing a
judgment for the plaintiff candidate, the Court held that the New York
Times rule covered "every conceivable aspect of [the candidate's] pub-
lic and private life that he thinks may lead the electorate to gain a good
impression of him."'' The Court admitted that this analysis went far
beyond the rubric of official conduct. Moreover, the Court deemed
irrelevant the fact that a considerable span of time had elapsed since the
commission of the alleged criminal activities. This last aspect is espe-
cially interesting because it suggests that, at least in terms of the person-
al history of a public official or candidate for public office, a past event
116. 336 F. Supp. at 138.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356, 358 (2d Cir. 1971);
Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Arizona Biochem.
Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412, 415-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
119. LaBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Gal-
ella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 224-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified, and aff'd without
considering the point, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. Cantrell v. Forest City Pub-
lishing Co., 484 F.2d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd without considering the point, 419
U.S. 245 (1974).
120. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
121. Id. at 274.
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will always be newsworthy if relevant to his public career.'22 Ocala
Star-Banner Co. v. Damron23 involved an accusation of perjury against
a candidate for county tax assessor. In setting aside a judgment for the
plaintiff the Court held that, for the purpose of applying the New York
Times rule, a charge of criminal conduct against an official or candi-
date, no matter how remote in time or place, is always relevant to his
fitness for office."2  These holdings further blurred the distinction
between public and private life.
2. The Conjunction of Interest and Status Analysis in Rosenbloom
The next step was taken in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.2 5 There the considerations implicit in Butts were
made explicit: interest analysis became a determinant of status analy-
sis. Rosenbloom involved a radio broadcast that accused the plaintiff, a
private person, of being a "smut merchant" and "girlie book peddler."
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, which
had reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, concluding that:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is in-
volved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntar-
ily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in
the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and
the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the partici-
pant's prior anonymity or notoriety.... We honor the commitment
to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First
Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion
and communication involving matters of public or general concern,
122. Accord, with respect to past newsworthy events in the lives of others than pub-
lic officials and candidates, Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 381-82 (4th Cir.
1971); Werner v. Hearst Publishing Co., 297 F.2d 145, 147 (9th Cir. 1961); Jenkins v.
Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958); Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,
186 F.2d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 1951); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). Johnston states that: "[n]o rule of repose
exists to inhibit speech relating to the public career of a public figure so long as news-
worthiness and public interest attach to events in such public career. This issue of
remoteness . . . has often arisen in privacy cases. There are, it is true, distinctions be-
tween actions for an invasion of privacy and suits for defamation but the same consider-
ations it would seem would be present in either case in determining whether mere pas-
sage of time will remove the protection afforded by the constitutional privilege created
by New York Times for a publication relating to a past event in the career of a 'public
figure."' [Footnotes omitted.]
123. 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
124. Id. at 300.
125. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The plurality opinion was authored by Justice Brennan
and joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justice Blackmun; Justices White and Black
each concurred on separate grounds. Justices Harlan and Marshall dissented and Justice
Douglas took no part in the decision.
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without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous. 126
The plurality buttressed this conclusion with the argument that a
private figure has as much access to media for the purposes of rebuttal
as a public figure has. The crucial point is not whether the plaintiff is
famous enough to command equal time to refute any libelous charges,
but rather whether the story is "hot" enough to make a victim's rebuttal
newsworthy. 27  The plurality sidestepped the contention that a public
figure assumes the risk of defamation, asserting simply that this conten-
tion is a "legal fiction," and that everyone is to some extent a public
personage.'2 The plurality did, however, leave open the standard of
proof necessary in suits concerning activities outside the public interest
by stressing that its decision did not deal with unwarranted intrusions
upon the private aspects of an individual's life.129
There are several problems inherent in Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion. He speaks of public or general interest but nowhere does he
indicate how general a general interest need be to merit application of
the New York Times rule. As was the case with "public interest" in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, the phrase "general interest" is too elastic to be truly
helpful as a guideline. Justice Brennan also indicates that in Rosen-
bloom the public had a vital interest in the proper enforcement of
criminal laws.' 30 If the criterion is defined in terms of what the public
needs to be informed about, then perhaps one can say there is no vital
public interest in being informed about the factual origins of a new
Broadway play, the details of a divorce case, or similar subjects. If this
is a valid inference, then Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom
seemingly retreats a step or two from his assertions in Time, Inc. v. Hill.
The plurality opinion suggests that the public's focus is on the conduct
of the participants in a newsworthy event, not on their prior anonymity
or notoriety. If so, the problem then arising is whether the Court should
adopt the public's focus as a starting point and provide no means of
redress for the aggrieved individual. Arguably they should not adopt
such a focus, but the plurality fails to address the problem. Justice
Brennan also decries artificial distinctions between public and private
individuals, but one result of his opinion is to preserve this distinction
with regard to the personal aspects of an individual life. Such an
126. Id. at 43-44 (footnotes omitted). Compare Rosenbloom with United Medical
Laboratories v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 404 F.2d 706, 711 (9th Cir. 1968).
The language cited in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion appears to be borrowed directly
from the earlier decision. In a footnote he seems to implicitly acknowledge the debt.
403 U.S. at 46 n.14. See notes 103-06 and text accompanying supra.
127. 403 U.S. at 46.
128. Id. at 48.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 43.
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approach can result in an individual's entire past history becoming a
subject of public interest merely because of his involvement in a news-
worthy event. The plurality itself admits that "[t]he individual's inter-
est in privacy . . . is not involved in this case, or even in the class of
cases under consideration, since, by hypothesis, the individual is in-
volved in matters of public or general concern.'' 1 3 In a sense, then, the
Rosenbloom plurality opinion embellishes the theories expressed in
Time, Inc. v. Hill. Conceivably, the only way an individual can retain
his right of privacy is to completely avoid becoming embroiled in any
event likely to attract public interest. This would seem to be prior
restraint in its purest form.
Justice Brennan's opinion represented the consensus of three jus-
tices. Justice Black concurred in the result but advanced his familiar
absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment,' 32 and Justice White in
his concurrence refused to venture beyond the boundaries laid down in
the New York Times case. 133 Many lower courts accepted the plurality
opinion of Rosenbloom, however.13.4 One court even went so far as to
say that the decision unquestionably extended the scope of the constitu-
tional privilege.'3 5
3. Gertz and Beyond
It rapidly became apparent that Rosenbloom was a digression by
three members of the Court. In Gordon v. Random House, Inc.' 36 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that the
plurality opinion in Rosenbloom was not supported by a majority of the
Court and suggested that its usefulness as a prophesy of the Court's
eventual stance would depend upon the unarticulated First Amendment
philosophies of Justices Powell and Rehnquist.13 7  The court in Gordon
concluded that before it can be determined if the New York Times rule
131. Id. at 48.
132. Id. at 57.
133. Id. at 57-62.
134. Mistrot v. True Detective Publishing Corp., 467 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1972);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 990-91 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1383 (7th Cir. 1972);
Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1050, 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 306, 307 (9th Cir. 1971); Time, Inc. v. Johnston,
448 F.2d 378, 381-82 (4th Cir. 1971); LaBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979,
983 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622, 625 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Airlie Foundation,
Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 337 F. Supp. 421, 423 (D.D.C. 1972); Novel v.
Garrison, 338 F. Supp. 977, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1971); McFarland v. Hearst Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 746, 748-49 (D. Md. 1971).
135. Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133, 137 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
136. 486 F.2d 1356 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'g 349 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
137. Id. at 1359-60.
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is applicable in a libel case, the threshold question that must be resolved
is whether the plaintiff had led an obscure private life or had taken part
in a public controversy.13 8  This conclusion was vindicated by the
decision of the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
3 9
overruling sub silentio the plurality view expressed in Rosenbloom. The
Court pointed out that the state interest in the context of libel suits
brought by private persons appreciably differed from that present in
actions instituted by public figures. The Court concluded that this
difference required the formulation of new guidelines for libel suits
involving private-party plaintiffs. 140 Justice Powell went on to demolish
the arguments for extending the constitutional privilege advanced by
Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom, and contended that public figures and
officials are better able to counteract defamations than are private
persons. He accepted the argument that the public plaintiff has as-
sumed the risk of defamation by placing himself in the public eye and
that the media may act on this assumption. In conclusion Justice
Powell held that "[t]he 'public or general interest' test for determining
the applicability of the New York Times standard to private defamation
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake.'
14
.
Thus he would allow the states to define a lesser evidentiary burden for
the private-party plaintiff in libel suits so long as they did not adopt any
theory of strict liability.
In defining the term public figure, Justice Powell pointed out that
it included both celebrities who command pervasive notoriety in all
contexts of public discussion and individuals who voluntarily or involun-
tarily are drawn into public controversies and become public figures for
a limited range of issues.' 42 He admitted that in rare cases such a
creature as an "involuntary public figure" could exist 43 but concluded
this description did not fit Gertz.
Following the emphasis in Gertz on the status of the plaintiff, one
district court recently suggested that the criterion suitable for distin-
guishing a "private person" from a "private person turned public figure"
should be the same one announced in Butts and Walker: did the
plaintiff intentionally seek to publicize his view; did he purposefully
thrust himself into the "vortex" of a controversy? 44 Thus, at least in
138, Id. at 1361. Cf. Dietemann v. Time, ,Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 931 (C.D. Cal.
1968).
139. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For the facts of this case see text accompanying notes
79-80 supra.
140. Id. at 343.
141. Id. at 346.
142. Id. at 351.
143. Id. at 345.
144. Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1333-34 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See
also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); Grove v. Dun & Brad-
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libel cases, Gertz turned the clock back to 1967 by stressing the status of
the plaintiff as the key to application of the New York Times rule. Like
Butts, Gertz combines interest and status analysis, at least to a small
extent. But the majority in Gertz was unwilling to carry the conse-
quences of this approach as far as the plurality in Rosenbloom did.
Gertz has been characterized as an unworkable step backward
from Rosenbloom.'45 The practical result seems to be that the problem
of how to deal with the private-party plaintiff is dumped in the lap of
the states, which are furnished minimal guidelines with which to work.
Justice Powell and the four justices joining him effectively gutted the
plurality holding in Rosenbloom and arguably did the same to Time,
Inc. v. Hill. The language condemning the public interest test would
seem to leave very little of the opinion in the latter case.'46 In a
footnote however, Justice Powell distinguished Time, Inc. v. Hill as
involving both "nondefamatory factual errors" and an "unusual state
statute"'147 that provided a remedy for undesired publicity, so perhaps
the discrete context involved in that case exempts it from the full force
of his statements. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Gertz may
indeed deprive the holding in Time, Inc. v. Hill of its continuing vitality.
As Justice Powell later noted in his concurrence in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn,48 Gertz seemingly "calls into question the conceptual
basis of Time, Inc. v. Hill."' 49 If he is incorrect, then a dual standard
would operate; in libel cases courts would determine whether the plain-
tiff was a public or private figure, while in privacy cases the public
interest test would be applied.' 0
The most recent explication of Gertz occurred in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone.'5' Mary Alice Firestone was the third wife of Russell A.
street, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 435 (3d Cir. 1971); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing
Co., 362 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir. 1966); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp.
1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1975); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042,
1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
145. El Meson Espanol v. N.Y.M. Corp., 389 F. Supp. 357, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
146. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
147. 418 U.S. at 335-36 n.6.
148. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
149. Id. at 498. The majority opinion in Cox failed, however, to address this prob-
lem.
150. Quaere: What occurs in a suit alternatively charging libel and false light in-
vasion of privacy? See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 652A (Tent. Draft No.
13, 1967); Berry v. National Broadcasting Co., 480 F.2d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1973). Both
indicate that a plaintiff cannot evade constitutional limitations placed on defamation by
suing on another theory. Arguably the same could be said for invasion of privacy.
151. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). The opinion of the Court in this case was written by
Justice Rehnquist and joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
and Powell. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, wrote a concurring opinion in
which he recommended reversal because none of the state courts had explicitly consid-
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Firestone, heir to the tire fortune, and she was also a prominent member
of the Palm Beach sporting set. In 1964, she filed a complaint for
separate maintenance in a Florida circuit court. Her husband counter-
claimed for a divorce, alleging extreme cruelty and adultery. The
resulting trial lasted seventeen months, commanded national news cov-
erage, and was publicized by forty-five articles in the Palm Beach Post
and Palm Beach Times, and forty-three articles in the Miami Herald.
Throughout the trial, the respondent held press conferences in which she
commented on the proceedings. On December 15, 1967, a decree was
entered, finding that "from the evidence of marital discord...
neither of the parties has shown the least susceptibility to domestica-
tion."' 1512 The decree also awarded the respondent $3000 per month
alimony. It was significant that under Florida law at that time no
award of alimony could be given to a wife adjudged guilty of adultery.
The evening that the decree was handed down, the Time magazine
staff received a wire dispatch saying Russell A. Firestone had been
divorced from his third wife, whom he had accused of adultery and
extreme cruelty. A New York Daily News article dated December 16
repeated the substance of the Associated Press dispatch. A report from
the magazine's Palm Beach stringer quoted language from the decree
about "extramarital escapades . . . of an amatory nature which would
have made Dr. Freud's hair curl";153 however, this language referred to
evidence proffered by the husband, which the circuit court specifically
discounted as unreliable. 154 Later that day, the Time staff received
another report from the stringer saying that the technical grounds for
the divorce were adultery and extreme cruelty. This account was
ered whether or not the petitioner was in fact negligent. He also suggested that be-
cause of the ambiguity of the original divorce decree, Time's interpretation of that
order might be entirely reasonable. Id. at 469. Justice Brennan dissented on the the-
ory that, under Rosenbloom, erroneous reportage of public proceedings is shielded by
constitutional privilege. Id. at 474-81. Justice White also dissented, arguing that at the
time of the alleged libel in 1967, the states could impose liability without fault because
Gertz was not decided until seven years later. Justice White also felt that the Florida
Supreme Court had, at any rate, made a conscious determination of negligence. Id. at
482-83. Justice Marshall was the final dissenter. He concluded that Mary Alice Fire-
stone was a public figure under the rules laid down in Gertz and Butts. Id. at 484-
90.
152. Id. at 451. One of the problems inherent in the language of this decree was
that "lack of domestication" was not and is not a ground for divorce under the law of
Florida. When the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the divorce decree, it noted this
deficiency but nevertheless affirmed the order of the lower court on the theory that the
trial record disclosed sufficient evidence to establish extreme cruelty, which is an ade-
quate ground for dissolution of marriage in that state. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So.
2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972).
153. 424 U.S. at 452.
154. Id. at 449-52.
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repeated in an article printed in the "Milestones" section of the issue for
December 22. None of the senior members of the staff in New York
City had actually read the decree.
Mary Alice Firestone sued Time for libel, and won an award of
$100,000. After several years of appeals in the state courts, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed this judgment.' 55 On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court Time alleged that the respondent was a public
figure under Gertz, and that therefore she should have been required to
prove actual malice. Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court,
flatly disagreed. He did indicate that the judgment should be reversed,
however, basing his conclusion on the theory that none of the three state
courts had "supportably ascertained petitioner was at fault."'156 Under
Gertz, while the states could impose less stringent evidentiary pre-
requisites for recovery in defamation cases involving private persons,
155. This litigation produced a labyrinthine tangle of decisions by the Florida
courts. Since many of these decisions are cited by the justices of the Supreme Court
in their various opinions, it is necessary to sketch briefly the history of this lawsuit. Ini-
tially, when sued for libel, defendant was granted a summary judgment. Plaintiff chal-
lenged this ruling and it was reversed by the appellate court, which remanded the case
for trial, concluding that disputed issues of material fact were present. Firestone v.
Time, Inc., 231 So. 2d 862, 864 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1970).
The second proceeding in the trial court resulted in a verdict for and award of damages
to Mary Alice Firestone; Time appealed. The court of appeals made two major determi-
nations. It held that the original divorce trial had been a matter of public concern under
Rosenbloom. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. App. 1971). It also
concluded that the prerequisite of actual malice could not be proven because Time had
offered one rational interpretation of an ambiguous document. Id. at 390. See note
73 supra.
The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled that although a socialite's
divorce may be newsworthy, in this instance no logical connection existed between the
respondent's reported activities and the real concerns of the public. Firestone v. Time,
Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972). On remand, the court of appeals refused to deal
in detail with the contentions raised by the state supreme court. It simply stipulated
that (a) the respondent had no cause of action, (b) Time's publication was fair and ac-
curate, (c) the respondent had failed to overcome Time's privilege to report on public
proceedings, (d) Time had had a fair trial uninfluenced by passion or prejudice, and (e)
the respondent had failed to introduce evidence entitling her to compensatory damages.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 279 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. App. 1973).
On certiorari, the Florida Supreme Court held that the jury's award of damages was
justified because the trial judge had specifically instructed the jury that Mary Alice Fire-
stone could recover only for damages naturally and directly flowing from Time's defama-
tion. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1974). The court relied on
dictum by a Florida court of appeals in an earlier case, to the effect that the test of
the defendant's liability in libel cases involving summaries of public decrees is whether
or not the public's reading of the news report would have a "different effect" from the
public's reading of the decree. McCormick v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 139 So. 2d
197, 200 (Fla. App. 1962), quoted in Firestone v. Time, Inc., supra, 305 So. 2d at 177. It
was this last decision which Time appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
156. 424 U.S. at 461-62.
[Vol. 3
they were precluded from adopting a rule of liability without fault. 157 In
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, the failure of the Florida courts to assign
fault to Time was tantamount to the imposition of strict liability. 158
Time argued that Mary Alice Firestone was a public figure. In
light of her status as a socialite, the intense public interest in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, and her frequent press conferences during
the trial, it would seem that Mrs. Firestone did inject herself into a
"particular public controversy and thereby [became] a public figure for a
limited range of issues."'15 9 Clearly the limited range of issues in this
case could include the final disposition of the divorce proceedings. As
Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, Mary Alice Firestone com-
manded sufficient media access to be able to rebut Time's libel; more-
over, by becoming voluntarily embroiled in this controversy, she seem-
ingly courted attention from the media, thus implicitly -accepting the
attendant risk of injury to her reputation. 60
Justice Rehnquist, however, characterized the respondent's position
differently. He felt that she was compelled to resort to the judicial
process to seek dissolution of her marriage; in his view, there was no
indication that she held press conferences for the purposes of thrusting
herself "to the forefront of some unrelated controversy in order to
influence its resolution."' 61 Justice Rehnquist rejected the notion that all
157. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
158. 424 U.S. at 461-62. Justice Rehnquist's rationale is dubious. The Supreme
Court of Florida had specifically held that, in view of the state statute denying alimony
to a spouse found guilty of adultery, Time personnel should have realized that the string-
er's report was inconsistent with the terms of the decree. The state court had concluded
that this was journalistic negligence. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla.
1974). Justice Rehnquist admitted the relevance of this passage but said in order to
affirm he "would have to attribute to the Supreme Court of Florida from the quoted
language not merely an intention to affirm the finding of the lower court, but an inten-
tion to find such a fact in the first instance." 424 U.S. at 463. In his view, this would
not suffice as a "conscious determination" of fault.
But the finding of the Florida Supreme Court was just such a determination. See
id. at 484 (White, J., dissenting). However, Justice Rehnquist's analysis would not be
so troubling had he simply said that no recovery could be awarded in a libel suit unless
the jury first found negligence on the part of the defendant. But he specifically found
no prohibition against a finding of fault being made in the first instance by the appel-
late court rather than by the trial court. Id. at 461. Such a cart-before-the-horse ap-
proach seems unsound; nevertheless, even assuming that this is a valid approach, it is un-
clear why Justice Rehnquist should object to what the Florida courts did in this case.
159. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
160. 424 U.S. at 487 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 454-55 n.3. It is unclear what Justice Rehnquist means by an unrelated
controversy. The press conferences in question dealt with the divorce trial then under
way, and that was a distinctly related controversy. In the footnote, Justice Rehnquist
cites Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. But the language on that page refers to those who "thrust
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controversies of interest to the public are public controversies.1 62  This
suggests that the latter category includes only matters of legitimate
public interest, the test formulated earlier in the United Labs case and
seconded by the plurality in Rosenbloom.'63 But Justice Rehnquist also
states that Gertz repudiated Rosenbloom and substituted a status analy-
sis test for the public interest analysis approach.' Although Justice
Rehnquist's analysis of Gertz appears to be inherently inconsistent, his
opinion was joined by four justices, including Justice Powell, who
authored the main opinion in Gertz. Firestone thus raises more ques-
tions than it answers, and it can be regarded not as a logical progression
from Gertz, but rather as an aberration. 65
Arguably, the Gertz rationale is applicable to privacy cases and the
courts should take the next logical step by discrediting Time, Inc. v;
Hill. In privacy suits it is entirely sensible to condition the limitation of
liability upon the status of the plaintiff. Public officials and voluntary
celebrities might be said to have consented to intrusions upon their
privacy, but perhaps this consent could be restricted to disclosure of
facts bearing upon their public lives. For example, the press should not
be privileged to disclose the homosexual status of a citizen who vocally
supports a municipal reform program. This type of very private matter
should arguably be protected from publicity, although disclosures of
other classes of facts might not be similarly shielded. 66  The same
analysis should also apply to involuntary public figures. Moreover, in
both instances it is appropriate to recognize the effect of lapse of time,
and admit that a former celebrity who retires from public view and seeks
seclusion should have his right to privacy protected. As Gertz suggests,
the standard applied to the private individual should be entirely different
from that applied to the celebrity because the private person has not
implicitly waived his right to have the intimate details of his life shielded
from public exposure. Courts should look at the factors set forth in the
balancing test adopted by Goldman v. Time, Inc."' to determine
whether the particular case merits application of the New York Times
rule. While it is true that the court in Firestone failed to do this, its
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved." Arguably the respondent did just that.
162. 424 U.S. at 454.
163. See notes 103-06, 126 and text accompanying supra. Accord, 424 U.S. 488
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 456. But see id. at 474-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. The current inconsistency in the Court's decisions has troubled Justice Bren-
nan, who professes to find the Court's vacillating approach in defamation cases
"strange." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 723 n.l1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1975); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964).
167. See text accompanying notes 113-17 supra.
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omission does not negate the contention that the Goldman approach is
the optimum means for determining the newsworthiness of a particular
public controversy.
B. The Status of the Defendant as a Determinant of Liability
Surprisingly, the federal courts have devoted little attention to the
status of the defendant as a criterion for determining whether the actual
malice test should be applied in any given set of circumstances. A few
decisions have analyzed the extent of the immunity a particular class of
defendants may claim under the First Amendment. 168 But apart from a
brief and noncommittal footnote included in the plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,'8 9 the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the issue of whether the constitutional privilege enunciated in
New York Times should apply equally to media and private-party
defendants. The Court has decided a few libel cases involving non-
media defendants but has ignored the potential issue. 70
Other courts have not been so reticent. One state court has
explicitly stated that the actual malice test applies to private-party
defendants in some libel cases;' 7' and one federal court has expressly
followed suit. In Fram v. Yellow Cab Company of Pittsburgh,72 the
defendant's lawyer allegedly defamed Fram in the course of a televised
interview by impliedly describing him as paranoid and schizophrenic.
Fram sued the Yellow Cab Company for libel but failed to join the
television station as a defendant. Fram contended that the district court
should not apply the New York Times actual malice test because, as a
result of the procedural detail, no media defendant was involved in the
lawsuit. The court disagreed, concluding that "[tihe application of the
168. E.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 315-16 (1973) (held the Speech and De-
bate Clause-U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6-confers immunity upon Congressmen who author
tortious statements, but does not protect private printers who publish those statements);
Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp.
1026, 1030 n.15 (D.D.C. 1975) (both holding that the "penumbras" of the First Amend-
ment afford no special protection to investigative reporters). See also Firestone v.
Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 719 (5th Cir. 1972).
169. 403 U.S. 29, 30-31 n.1 (1971).
170. E.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (defendant a defeated sen-
atorial candidate); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defendant a labor
union). See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (party
initially enjoined in an invasion of privacy suit was a racially integrated community or-
ganization). In each case the Court held that the allegedly defaming party should pre-
vail because the plaintiff's allegations did not sufficiently state circumstances from which
actual malice could be inferred.
171. Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 183, 188 N.W.2d 494, 499 (1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972).
172. 380 F. Supp. 13.14 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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New York Times' constitutional prohibition does not turn on whether
the defendant is the communications media.""' 3
The issue is not so clear-cut. Many of the underlying justifications
for the actual malice test are founded upon the compelling need for a
free press and upon the "chilling effect" the threat of lawsuits and
rigorous verification procedures would have on the media. 4  Perhaps
the scope of the New York Times rule should be construed to protect
'only media defendants. Arguably, however, the broad generalizations
in the New York Times decision about the necessity for robust debate
and unimpeded public criticism imply that the rule of that case should
extend to private party defendants who, if anything, are even less able to
bear the potential twin burdens of costly litigation and difficult verifi-
cation.
Fram was a libel case, but the applicability of the foregoing con-
siderations to suits for invasion of privacy is also unsettled due to the
inherent limitations of Time, Inc. v. Hill,"75 and to the effect of the
Gertz holding on the "conceptual basis" of the earlier case. 176 This
issue should be accorded more attention than the courts have given it,
inasmuch as many of the privacy cases involve the tactics of non-media
defendants that infringe individual rights. In one case, a defendant
corporation erroneously assumed that the plaintiff was in arrears on his
credit card account and its agents consequently stripped the tires from
his car in full view of his co-workers. 7 7 Another suit arose from the
conduct of a plaintiff's creditor, who telephoned his employer, accused
the plaintiff of being a "cheat," and suggested that the employer fire
him."18  A third situation involved the issuance of insurance policies to
a corporation. As part of its routine procedures, the insurer had an
independent agency make a credit check, and the agency subsequently
sold the information it obtained to the corporation's creditors.7 9 A
fourth instance involved a challenge to a New York statute authorizing
173. Id. at 1334. But cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
The language of this case seems to limit the applicability of the dual standard test to
suits involving publishers and broadcasters. In fact, Justice Powell's opinion consistently
refers to media, not private-party defendants. See also Brosnahan, From Times v. Sulli-
van to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment,
26 HASTINGs LJ. 777, 792-93 (1975).
174. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 228-30 intra.
176. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
177. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962).
178. Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89 (D.S.C. 1967).
179. Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W. Vaw
1968).
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the sale of the information contained in driver registration forms to mail
order houses and to other buyers.18 0
Only one of these privacy cases upheld the plaintiff's cause of
action, 8" but the factual situations involved are illustrative. Arguably,
constitutional privilege in any guise should not be extended to these
types of defendants. The cases mentioned involved neither debate on
public matters nor comment upon the actions of public figures or
officials. The interests involved were not those of criticism and free
speech, but rather were pecuniary in nature. The disclosures made by
the defendants did not serve the public interest but instead were self-
serving. To permit the defendant to invoke constitutional privilege as a
defense where the underlying justifications are absent would impose an
unnecessarily severe burden on the plaintiff. Consequently, it is reason-
able to condition the application of the actual malice test on the status
of the defendant as well as on that of the plaintiff. The broad generaliza-
tion offered by Judge Scalera in Fram is, on reflection, self-defeating.
The courts should be extremely wary of extending the doctrine of consti-
tutional privilege to lawsuits in which it is inappropriate. Arguably,
the techniques for determining whether the privilege is applicable should
not be so broad that the courts are prevented from discriminating be-
tween the interests at stake for media and non-media defendants and,
on the basis of those interests, restricting the scope of the protection
afforded by the First Amendment. Again, the Supreme Court needs
to delineate complete guidelines on this issue.
IV. The Damage Issue
A. The Theory of Damages in Libel and Invasion of Privacy Actions
Once it has been established that a plaintiff is required to prove
actual malice, then only the question of measuring damages remains.
This question can best be addressed by briefly sketching the theory of
damages in libel actions. Under the common law of most states there
are two varieties of libel: libel per se and libel per quod. Libel per se
requires no pleading or proof of special damages; the very fact of
publication creates a conclusive presumption of compensable injury.
Libel per quod requires both pleading and proof of special damages, 82
180. Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
181. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962). In
Harrison, the suit was dismissed for lack of sufficiently offensive conduct. In Copley,
it was held that a corporation cannot sue for invasion of privacy. In Lamont, the chal-
lenge was rejected both because a public record was involved, and because the facts dis-
closed were neither vital nor intimate.
182. PRossnn, supra note 1, § 112, at 762-63; Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction
to Philosophy-The Requirement of Proof of Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CATHOLIC
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unless the statement falls into one of four special categories. 1 83  Once
the extrinsic facts causing special damages are proved, the plaintiff can
recover both compensatory and punitive damages.18 4  Under libel per
se, once the plaintiff proves publication he is entitled to recover nominal
damages at the very least,18  and often juries will grant compensation for
the presumed harm to the plaintiff's reputation. Dean Prosser con-
cludes that the courts treat invasion of privacy actions like libel per se to
the extent that they presume at least nominal damages.' 8 6  Of course
the plaintiff can recover punitive damages where he proves ill-will or
common law malice.
In the majority opinion of New York Times, the Court specifically
held that a plaintiff in a libel suit can recover no damages whatsoever
without first proving actual malice.' 87 The argument underlying this
conclusion is a familiar one: awards of damages have a "chilling
effect" upon freedom of expression. 88 Thus the Court recognized that
the very measure of recovery available to the plaintiff may impede free
speech.
Three years later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,8 9 a plurality
U.L. REV. 1, 4, 13 (1972). Professor Eldredge adopts the view prevalent in English
common law that all libel is defamatory per se, while the American Law Institute's posi-
tion is that proof and pleading of special damages is unnecessary if the defendant knew
or should have known of the extrinsic facts that cause these damages. See RESrATMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 569(c) (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
183. Usually listed as imputation of: (1) a serious crime, (2) a loathsome disease,
(3) injury to business, trade, profession, or office, and (4) unchastity in a woman. See
PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112 at 754-60.
184. Id. at 761.
185. Id. at 762. See generally C. McCoRmicK, LAw OF DAMAGES § 116-17 (1935).
186. PRoSSER, supra note 1, § 117 at 815. But cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
384-85 n.9 (1967), where Justice Brennan suggests right of privacy actions have affini-
ties with libel per quod rather than with libel per se.
The entire issue may be moot since the Gertz case appears to erode the distinctions
between libel per se and libel per quod by not allowing the jury to presume damages
even if the defamation is on its face injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974). However, one commentator has argued that
Gertz abolishes presumed damages only for that type of defamation per se defined as
being actionable without proof of damage, not for that type of defamation per se defined
as involving a statement that is defamatory on its face. Note, Defamation Law in the
Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Impact on State Law and the First Amend-
ment, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 960, 975-76 n.88 (1975). Both this author and apparently,
Justice White disagree with that commentator's interpretation. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., supra at 392-93 (White, J., dissenting).
187. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
188. But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390-91 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice White points out the dearth of hard data to support this rationale.
See also T. EMERSON, Tm SY-EM oF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 519 (1970); C. Mc-
CoRMIcK, LAw OF DAMAGES § 77 at 278 (1935).
189. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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of the Court upheld an award of punitive damages in a libel case on
the theory that any special exemption afforded a publisher was not
required by the First Amendment and would provide him with an
invidious advantage over other defendants. The plurality declared that
where the defendant's conduct is severe enough to "strip from him the
constitutional protection our decision acknowledges, we think it entirely
proper for the State to act not only for the protection of the individual
injured but to safeguard all those similarly situated against like abuse."'190
The problem with the opinion is that it deems the test for punitive
damages to be common law malice rather than actual malice,' but
under New York Times, the plaintiff would first have to prove knowledge
or reckless disregard in order to recover even compensatory damages.
The opinion in Butts failed to clarify whether or not it meant to indicate
that the New York Times damage analysis did not apply to cases involv-
ing public figures.' 92
The problem received careful scrutiny in Judge Waterman's opin-
ion in Goldwater v. Ginzburg.193 Citing Butts as support, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the
federal law does not pre-empt state laws that permit plaintiffs in libel
per se actions to receive awards without proof of special damages. 94
Again citing Butts, the court pointed out that punitive damages serve
two legitimate state needs: they safeguard individual rights and they
act as a deterrent. 95 But of course in Goldwater punitive damages
were awarded after a showing of actual malice, so the result was entirely
consistent with the New York Times decision.
The district court in Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star News-
paper Co.,'96 faced a similar situation, but its stance was more cautious.
It held that all damage awards in the area of free speech must be closely
scrutinized for excessiveness in order to ward off any chilling effect.197 It
therefore refused to allow compensation to the plaintiff for all of the
losses sustained because those losses might not have been the direct
result of the defendant's false accusation. The court considered an
award of nominal damages to be sufficient compensation for any injury
to reputation and, in light of the defendant's subsequent retraction and
apology, scaled down the jury's award of punitive damages.
190. Id. at 161.
191. See note 56 supra.
192. Cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 54 n.19 (1971).
193. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970). For the facts
of the case, see text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
194. Id. at 340.
195. Id. at 341.
196. 337 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1972). For the facts of the case, see text accom-
panying note 77 supra.
197. Id. at 431.
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The district court's caution was justified. In Gertz, the Supreme
Court announced a strict damage standard: no punitive damages are
allowable except upon proof of actual malice. 198 Thus after Gertz a
private party could sue a publisher on a theory of negligence, but he
could recoup only his actual losses, which might be minimal or very
difficult to prove.'99 The Court based its conclusion on several
factors: first, the unpredicability and irrationality inherent in the size
of jury verdicts; second, the irrelevancy of punitive damages to the state
interest in permitting a plaintiff to sue on the basis of negligence,
because such damages represent a windfall rather than compensation for
injury; and finally, the possibility that punitive damages would exacer-
bate the risk of self-censorship in the media. 00 These justifications
advanced by the Court are really ipse dixits; Gertz does little more in the
area of suits involving public figures than reiterate the rule of New York
Times that no damages, compensatory or punitive, may be awarded
without proof of actual.malice.2°' The major modification announced
by Gertz is that the private party plaintiff can be recompensed for his
actual losses upon proof of mere negligence. In this respect, Gertz
presents a relaxation of the consequences with respect to damage awards
created by the strict rule advanced by the plurality in Rosenbloom.
The subsidiary issue is whether or not the damage discussion in
Gertz applies to privacy cases. If, as Prosser suggests, the award of
damages for invasion of privacy is procedurally similar to that for libel,
the analogy might be valid. The damage aspect of New York Times,
which was carried over into the privacy area in Time, Inc. v. Hill,
remains controlling law, but Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. 20 2
is bothersome in this respect. In Cantrell, the trial judge held in effect
that the plaintiff could not recover punitive damages because he
had not proved common law malice; however, the judge permitted the
case to go to the jury, which found actual malice and awarded compen-
satory damages. The Supreme Court approved, saying that the trial
judge, in denying punitive damages, had not drawn any conclusions
about the defendant's actual malice or lack of it, but had merely found
that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant harbored ill-will.
198. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
199. Accord, Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation
of Public Communication, 46 TEXAs L. REv. 650, 658-67 (1968); Kalven, Privacy In
Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEM:P. PROB. 326, 334
(1966). But cf. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117 at 815 n.44.
200. 418 U.S. at 350.
201. Accord, Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1975); MacNeil v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1975).
202. 419 U.S. 245 (1974). For the facts of the case, see text accompanying notes
238-39 infra,
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This reasoning seems questionable. Gertz predicated an award of
punitive damages upon proof of actual malice; since the jury found
actual malice in Cantrell it could, under the logic of Gertz, grant both
punitive and compensatory damages. Thus, according to Gertz, the
trial judge should not have dismissed the punitive damage claim unless
he was also willing to grant a summary judgment for the defendant. 0 3
The Court's position in Cantrell seems inconsistent with Gertz unless
one concludes that the damage doctrine of the latter decision is not
meant to apply to privacy cases. Further analysis by the Supreme
Court is needed to clarify the issue of punitive damages in privacy
actions.
B. Application of Gertz in Subsequent Libel Cases
The cases following Gertz have tread warily in the quagmire
surrounding the issue of damages. In Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-
Hill, Inc.,20 4 plaintiff trucking corporation sued the publisher of a trade
journal that ran an article falsely intimating that the plaintiff was
bankrupt. The trial court awarded $245,000 in general damages, but
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
award was grossly excessive because the losses the plaintiff suffered were
at least partially due to its impaired finances, which had been a problem
before publication of the story. 05 Moreover, the trial judge had in-
structed the jury that they could award punitive damages because the
case involved libel per se; he had not conditioned the award of punitive
damages on proof of actual malice. 206  Consequently, the court of
appeals reversed and remanded the case on the damage issue. Drotz-
manns clearly shows that Gertz undercuts the libel per se/libel per
quod distinction by permitting an award of punitive damages in either
case only upon a showing of actual malice.
In Davis v. Schuchat,2°7 a slander per se case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pointed out that Gertz
denies punitive damages in all defamation cases tried on a theory of
negligence. But in Davis, because the plaintiff proved actual malice,
the state had an interest in allowing an award of punitive damages, even
203. It might be argued that because the trial in Cantrell occurred before the Su-
preme Court decided Gertz, the doctrine of the latter case is inapplicable in any event.
But in other circumstances, the Supreme Court has been willing to apply Gertz retroac-
tively. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55, 460-62 (1976). But cf. id.
at 484 (White, J., dissenting).
204. 500 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1974).
205. Id. at 835.
206. Id. at 836.
207. 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For the facts of this case, see text accom-
panying note 78 supra.
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to a public official. The court observed that punitive damages still serve
a valid function: "[They] are allowed because the civil law has long
recognized that in certain situations deterrence can better be achieved
through modification of the civil awards than through a requirement of
criminal sanctions." 208
While Davis represents one approach to the problem, Maheu v.
Hughes Tool Co.20 9 represents the opposite position. This case arose
out of a telephone interview allegedly made by Howard Hughes in
which he characterized Maheu as a "son of a bitch" and an embezzler.
Maheu sued on a theory of libel, requesting both compensatory and
punitive damages. The District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia stated that punitive damages are allowable only if they serve
"substantial" state interests.210  It outlined several possible state
interests: protection of reputation, protection of privacy, and deter-
rence of "conduct that is motivated by ill-will or is accompanied by
malice, fraud, or oppression."21' The court held that protection of
reputation is adequately assured by the threat of costly litigation and by
the award of compensatory damages. Protection of privacy was not
considered a compelling interest because public figures have consented
to invasions of their right of privacy. Finally, the court considered the
deterrence aspect2 12 and acknowledged that punitive damages do have a
deterrent effect. But a public figure like Maheu had access to the
media for purposes of rebuttal and, by placing himself in the public eye,
had voluntarily increased his risk of exposure to defamation. These
factors, according to the court, undercut the deterrence argument. The
opinion goes on to list the defects of the system of awarding punitive
damages: the unpredictability of juries, the absence of any dollar limit,
and the "chilling effect" on freedom of expression. The court conclud-
ed:
Because it would be difficult to objectively supervise the exer-
cise of the jury's discretion in this tender First Amendment area
and because unlimited, discretionary awards of punitive damages
do not narrowly and necessarily promote the special state interest
to protect the reputation and privacy of public figures from special
dangers flowing from highly malicious tortious defamation, i.e., the
greater probability that harm will be inflicted and that the magni-
tude of the harm will be larger, this court concludes that the First
Amendment precludes plaintiff's recovery of punitive damages.213
208. Id. at 738.
209. 384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
210. Id. at 170.
211. Id. at 172.
212. Id. at 171.
213. Id. at 173-74. As a result, Judge Pregerson held CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 was
unconstitutional to the extent it allowed punitive damages in libel cases. Id. at 174.
Compare Maheu with Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.),
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Maheu takes the logic of Gertz and pushes it to its furthest ex-
tent: only private persons who show actual malice may obtain puni-
tive damages. The interesting point is that District Judge Harry Preger-
son's arguments in this case are borrowed directly from Justice Powell's
opinion in Gertz. If Maheu is affirmed, its holding may even extend to
suits for invasion of privacy.2 14 As suggested, Maheu goes about as far
as any court has ever gone in this area; its effect would be to decrease
drastically the number of lawsuits brought by public figures and officials
because their actual pecuniary losses would be minimal or too specula-
tive.215 How the appellate courts respond to Judge Pregerson's opinion
will go far in establishing whether a judicially recognized cause of action
still exists as a legal device to deter invasions of privacy.
Punitive damages are not the sole problem in this area. The
analysis of compensatory awards in Gertz has also engendered confu-
sion. The Supreme Court, in deciding Time, Inc. v. Firestone,21 6 did
not have to consider the issue raised in Maheu. In Firestone, the
respondent withdrew all claims for injury to reputation before the
commencement of the libel trial; she sought damages solely for mental
anguish and was awarded $100,000.217 Justice Rehnquist said it was
irrelevant that Mary Alice Firestone chose not to recover for an injury to
reputation, because under Florida law she could recover for other
injuries without regard to the impairment of her good name, as long as
those injuries were proximately caused by the defamation. 218
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion is questionable. Not only did the
respondent waive recovery for injury to reputation, but a pretrial order
prevented Time from offering evidence to show the absence of such
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975). In Sprouse, the West Virginia court held that "puni-
tive damages may only be recovered in cases where the award of actual damages is in-
sufficient to dissuade others in like circumstances from committing similar acts in the
future." Id. at 692. See also Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 897 (2d Cir. 1976)
(suggested the type of 'approach taken in Maheu may be the logical outcome of
Gertz but declined to follow it until the Supreme Court speaks on the matter); Fopay
v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 198, 334 N.E.2d 79, 92 (1975) (called the rationale
of Maheu persuasive but contrary to the position of the Supreme Court).
214. See note 150 supra.
215. It is apparent that a plaintiff's actual damages will include, "in addition to out-
of-pocket injuries, [only] damages for impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, for personal humiliation, and for pain and mental anguish. All [such]
damages awarded must be solely compensatory and supported by competent evidence
showing the harm, although evidence of its dollar value need not be introduced." Law-
lor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Cf.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
216. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). For the facts of this case, see text accompanying notes
151-55 supra.
217. See 424 U.S. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 460.
Spring 19761 THE TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
injury.219 Damages for mental anguish in defamation cases have histo-
rically been regarded as parasitic; they may be "tacked on" only after
injury to reputation is proven.2 ' By withdrawing her claim for injury
to reputation, the respondent precluded herself from recovering any
damages connected to that claim. The result reached by the Florida
courts makes sense only if one assumes that they treated Time's allega-
tion of adultery as libel per se and thus actionable without proof of
injury; but in fact, the Florida Supreme Court rightly pointed out that
Gertz prohibited such a bald presumption of compensable harm.22 '
Gertz does permit recovery for mental anguish 222 but not until Firestone
did the Court suggest that such damages were anything but parasitic; as
a result, the court has partially obfuscated the nature and scope of
compensatory damages in defamation and privacy actions.
V. The Applicability of the Actual Malice Test to
Suits for Invasion of Privacy
The preceding sections have analyzed the three components of the
constitutional privilege created by New York Times and have triangulat-
ed the limits they place on the right of recovery for tortious invasion of
privacy. In this section, the issue confronted is whether a test of
privilege developed in a libel context should be applied in privacy suits
and if so, which types of privacy suits.
The tort action for defamation protects one's reputation; the two
branches of the tort action for invasion of privacy under discussion, by
providing a device for penalizing unauthorized disclosure, enable the
individual to determine for himself when and in what manner intimate
facts about him are to be disclosed to the public. In most jurisdictions,
truth is a defense to a charge of defamation in a civil case, so the falsity
of an assertion is the key factor in determining whether liability can be
imposed upon a defendant (absent some circumstance of privilege such
as coverture, consent by the plaintiff, or a report based on a public
record) .123 An invasion of privacy suit can be based, inter alia, on
either a theory of public disclosure of private facts or a theory of false
light. Under either theory, the test is whether publication of the matter
would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary
219. Id. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
220. See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112 at 761.
221. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 176-77 (Fla. 1974).
222. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
223. See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 116 at 796-99; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 582 (Tent. Draft. No. 20, 1974). Compare Perry v. Hearst Corp., 334 F.2d
800, 801 (1st Cir. 1964) with Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 290, 253
N.E.2d 408, 411 (1969).
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sensibilities; 224 the critical factor in such cases is whether the unauthor-
ized disclosure is a flagrant breach of the community's notions of morality
and decency.225 The tort of invasion of privacy through public dis-
closure of private facts recognizes a cause of action for publication of an
embarrassing private fact that is, by definition, entirely true. On the
other hand, when a plaintiff complains of being put in a false light in
the public eye, the publication in question need not be defamatory. The
best example of this latter type of case is Time, Inc. v. Hill, where the
false assertions contained in the play and in the Life magazine article
tended to cast the plaintiffs in a creditable light by emphasizing the
personal courage of the Hills during their ordeal. Thus, it is necessary
to make careful differentiations between the torts of defamation and
invasion of privacy and between the interests they safeguard. 2 6
Time, Inc. v. Hill applied the actual malice test to an invasion of
privacy case. Prosser's interpretation of Time, Inc. v. Hill is that by this
decision, the two branches of invasion of privacy that turn on publicity
were brought within the ambit of the constitutional privilege.2 7  But as
a matter of fact, the Court held only that the New York Times rule
"preclude[s] the application of the New York statute to redress false
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the
defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth. ' 228 The rule of Time, Inc. v. Hill
therefore applies only to false light cases. The Court explicitly noted that
it was not dealing with the constitutional questions that might arise if
truth were not a defense. 229  In a footnote, the Court added that the
problem of constitutional proscriptions of truthful publications would be
left open for later cases to resolve. 230  The application of the actual
malice test to false light cases is reasonable. 2 1 These cases do turn on
whether a false assertion of fact was published, so the New York Times
rule could legitimately be applied in this context. This is especially so
224. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117 at 811, 813. Accord, Leverton v. Curtis Publish-
ing Co., 192 F.2d 974, 976 (3d Cir. 1951); Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp.
327, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 652F, comment f at
130 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
225. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), afj'd,
113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
226. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967), in which Justice Brennan
makes such distinctions. Unfortunately, he apparently forgot his own good advice when
he wrote the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom.
227. PRossR, supra note 1, § 118, at 827. Accord, Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp.
196, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
228. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
229. Id. at 383-84.
230. Id. at 383 n.7.
231. See note 150 supra.
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when a plaintiff sues alternatively on the theories of libel and invasion of
privacy. If the ultimate issue (scienter with respect to falsity) is the
same for each theory, no reason exists for the courts to place liability-
limiting restrictions on libel and not on false light invasion of privacy.
Thus this aspect of the decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill is internally
consistent.23
For the same reason, the actual malice test developed in the New
York Times case has no application to the tort of invasion of privacy
through public disclosure of private facts because the issue at hand is
not falsity but the publication of facts that are concededly true. This
observation is borne out by a consideration of the application of Time,
Inc. v. Hill by the lower federal courts. That decision has been followed
in false light cases,233 but has not even been mentioned in public
disclosure of private facts cases.2 34  Thus, despite Prosser's generaliza-
tion, constitutional privilege as measured by the actual malice test has
not been extended to cases involving public disclosure of private facts.
What tests do apply? As has been suggested, the decision of the
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.235 seems to undercut the holding
of Time, Inc. v. Hill, at least according to Justice Powell.23 6 Even if
Justice Powell is incorrect, the holding in Gertz at least restricts the
decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill. Gertz established that the right of
recovery for a private-party plaintiff may be conditioned on a less
demanding burden of proof than that necessary for a public figure.
This dual standard was expressly limited to cases involving publication
of defamatory falsehoods injurious to a private individual.23 7  But
although Gertz was a libel case, the language limiting its application
apparently also embraces that class of false light cases in which the
publication was defamatory. Further, one can argue that, in terms of
logic and consistency, the dual standard of Gertz should apply to all
false light cases because in those cases, as in libel, one of the crucial
issues is scienter. Consequently, any change in the liability-limiting tests
232. Accord, Nimmer, supra note 8, at 963. Nimmer's central thesis is that a less
stringent test should be imposed in the privacy area because, while a reputation injured
by defamation may be rehabilitated by further speech, a disclosure that invades privacy
is an irreparable fait accompli. Id. at 961-62.
233. E.g., Berry v. National Broadcasting Co., 480 F.2d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1973);
Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1968); Cordell v.
Detective Publications, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212, 1219-20 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), afl'd, 419
F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969).
234. See, e.g., Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W.
Va. 1968); Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89 (D.S.C. 1967).
235. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
236. See notes 148-49 and text accompanying supra.
237. 418 U.S. at 347.
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applicable to libel should be carried into the area of false light invasion
of privacy. Time, Inc. v. Hill would require as much unless one argues
that the conceptual basis of that case is no longer valid.
Two invasion of privacy cases have been decided by the Supreme
Court since Gertz. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.2" 8 arose
from the publication of an article in the Cleveland Plain Dealer in-
accurately depicting the destitution and despair of a recently-widowed
woman with several young children. The widow instituted a diversity
action on the theory of false light invasion of privacy. The district court
judge dismissed a claim for punitive damages because of lack of proof of
common law malice but denied summary judgment for the defendants.
Mrs. Cantrell won an award for compensatory damages, which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The
district court judge's finding of no common law malice for the purpose
of awarding punitive damages was misconstrued by the appellate court
to mean that there was no actual malice as defined by New York Times.
The Supreme Court reversed, pointing out the error committed by the
court of appeals. Justice Stewart's opinion cited Time, Inc. v. Hill and
commented cryptically:
No objection was made by any of the parties to this knowing-or-
reckless-falsehood instruction [by the district judge]. Conse-
quently, this case presents no occasion to consider whether a State
may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability for
a publisher or broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private
individual under a false-light theory of invasion of privacy, or
whether the constitutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill
applies to all false-light cases. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323. 239
It is unclear to which false light cases Time, Inc. v. Hill should not
apply; its analysis would apparently control whether or not the false
light engendered by the publication was also defamatory. But Justice
Stewart's remark seems to bear out the observation that the dual stan-
dard of Gertz may apply in the privacy area. If so, then the federal
courts would differentiate between those false light cases involving
public figures and those that do not, and would apply Time, Inc. v. Hill
only to the former.
The second privacy case to come before the Court after Gertz was
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.240 Under a Georgia statute, it was a
misdemeanor to publish the names of rape victims. Cohn's daughter
had been raped and murdered. Six youths were indicted for this crime
and were brought to trial eight months later. A reporter for WXB-TV,
238. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
239. Id. at 250-51.
240. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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a Cox affiliate, attended the proceedings and learned the name of the
victim by scrutinizing the indictments, which had been placed on public
record. His broadcast disclosed the identity of the murdered girl. Cohn,
relying on the state statute, sued for invasion of privacy based on public
disclosure of private facts. The Georgia Supreme Court denied summa-
ry judgment for the defendants on the theory that the First Amendment
protections did not extend to this type of disclosure by the media.241 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance on
the narrow ground of the common law privilege to report upon matters
contained in a public record. But in the course of his opinion, Justice
White recognized the distinction between false light cases and public
disclosure of private facts cases. He pointed out that Time, Inc. v. Hill
applied the actual malice test only to the publication of "false or
misleading information" on "matters of public interest." '242 The Court
declined, however, to address the issue of what types of sanctions would
be permitted against publication of truthful information. Nor did the
Court say whether different standards should apply in the discrete area
of purely private libes.24 3 Justice Powell's concurrence argued that
under Gertz truth was a defense applicable even in cases of defamations
against private-party plaintiffs.2 44
In the false light privacy cases two options present themselves: ei-
ther the holding of Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false light cases; or
the dual standard of Gertz applies, and the courts will determine which
test of liability will be employed by considering whether the plaintiff is a
public official, public figure, or private person. Despite Justice Stew-
art's caveat in Cantrell, it seems reasonable to say that the validity of
Time, Inc. v. Hill as a controlling precedent is undiminished by Gertz.
Time, Inc. v. Hill has no bearing on the public disclosure of private
facts cases, however. In this field the Court also has several options, as
Cox suggests. It could conclude that truth is always a defense to the
imposition of liability, in which case this particular branch of the tort of
invasion of privacy will not survive. This outcome is unlikely, given the
Court's current composition. Alternatively, the Court could enunciate a
dual standard that would make liability depend on the character of the
fact disclosed. If the fact is a matter of legitimate general interest, then
the plaintiff could be denied recovery; if the fact is so intimate that it
bears no relationship to the appropriate concerns of the public, then the
plaintiff would have a cause of action. This ad hoc technique is a
241. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 68-69, 200 S.E.2d 127, 133-34
(1973).
242. 420 U.S. at 490.
243. Id. at 491.
244. Id. at 498-99.
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possibility, but it retains the vagueness inherent in the concept of general
interest.
A third approach has been taken by the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia. In Kapellas v. Kofman, 2 45 a housewife running for office was the
subject of a newspaper editorial. The article alleged that she was not
devoting enough time to her maternal duties and disclosed the fact that
several of her six children had had difficulties with the police. Plaintiff
sued on three theories: libel, false light invasion of privacy, and public
disclosure of private facts. The court pointed out that false light cases,
because they involve issues similar to those that appear in libel suits,
should meet the same requirements of a libel claim in all aspects of the
case, including that of malice.2 46  The court then applied a balancing
test involving several factors to determine whether the disclosure in-
volved met the criterion of newsworthiness necessary in privacy cases
generally.2 47 It concluded that under this test the plaintiff's claim for
libel and false light invasion of privacy could not stand. As to her claim
for invasion of privacy through public disclosure of private facts, the
court again consciously balanced the interests involved. It concluded
that if the publication does not substantially overstep the bounds of
"propriety and reason in disclosing facts about those closely related to
an aspirant for public office, the compelling public interest in the
unfettered dissemination of information will outweigh society's interest
in preserving such individuals' rights to privacy. 248
In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association,2 41 the California Su-
preme Court went even further than it had in Kapellas. In Briscoe, an
article in Reader's Digest disclosed that the plaintiff had been convicted
of armed robbery eleven years earlier, although he had since rehabili-
tated himself. One result of this publication was that both the plaintiff's
young daughter and his friends abandoned him. Briscoe sued on a theory
of invasion of privacy through public disclosure of private facts. The
California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal without
leave to amend. The court admitted that truthful reports of recent
crimes are protected by the First Amendment, and, in view of the pub-
lic's interest in law enforcement, suggested that disclosure of informa-
tion about past crimes might be similarly shielded.2 50 But it drew the
line by holding that disclosure of the names of the participants in past
crimes serves only to satisfy the public's frivolous curiosity, and that the
245. 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
246. Id. at 35 n.16, 459 P.2d at 921, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
247. Id. at 36, 459 P.2d at 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 370. See text accompanying note
137 supra.
248. 1 Cal. 3d at 37-38, 459 P.2d at 923, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
249. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
250. Id. at 537, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
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First Amendment does not protect such exposures.25' This is especially
true when the person named has since rehabilitated himself and when a
significant period of time has elapsed since his conviction. The court
concluded that a plaintiff may be allowed to recover on a theory of
public disclosure of private facts if he shows that a "publisher invaded
his privacy with reckless disregard for the fact that reasonable men would
find the invasion highly offensive. '252 This rather elegant test couples
the New York Times consideration of reckless disregard (and the inter-
pretations given to it by later decisions) with the traditional concept
of extreme offensiveness recognized by the California courts as early as
Melvin v. Reid."'3 It thus provides an objective criterion with which
to work, couched in phraseology already explicated by previous courts.
The Kapellas-Briscoe test is perhaps the optimal method of accommodat-
ing the rights of both free speech and privacy, but a caveat is necessary.
In Briscoe, the court imposed sanctions on publication of an item in
the public record. Faced with a similar problem, the Supreme Court in
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn254 held that "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not impose
sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official
court records open to public inspection. '255 Cox thus casts grave doubt
on the Briscoe decision, and indicates that the Supreme Court may be
unlikely to adopt the same approach.
Conclusion
The privacy cases recently decided by the Supreme Court have
raised more questions than they have answered. Cantrell was decided
on purely procedural grounds, while the ultimate basis for the decision
in Cox was a narrow but widely recognized privilege under the common
law of the states.250 The result of these decisions is to leave open many
crucial issues. One needs to know whether Time, Inc. v. Hill is still
conceptually valid, whether Gertz has any application to privacy actions,
what the test of privilege is in public disclosure of private facts cases,
251. Id., 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
252. Id. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
253. 112 Cal. App. 285, 291-92, 297 P. 91, 93 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931).
254. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
255. Id. at 495. Accord, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1331
(1975). It should be noted that the Georgia Supreme Court in the Cox case specifically
relied on Briscoe in reaching its conclusions, which the Supreme Court disapproved. See
also Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 891, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 370, 378 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1974). In this privacy case, the California Court
of Appeals distinguished Briscoe on the theory that in that earlier case the plaintiff had
sought anonymity in the hope that people would forget his former misdeeds, while in
Johnson, plaintiff had once again placed himself in the public eye.
256. See note 5 supra.
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what the status of punitive damages is in privacy cases, whether the
holding in Fram represents the settled state of the law, and what actually
is the scope of the constitutional right of privacy created by Griswold.
Cox is a heartening decision for two reasons. First, it draws the
distinctions between defamation and privacy, and between false light
and public disclosure of private facts cases. Second, it recognizes the
questions that need to be answered and suggests that a careful ad hoc
approach, rather than reliance on the precise but indiscriminate tech-
nique of "definitional balancing," will be used to answer those ques-
tions.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan stands for the proposition that in
certain circumstances, when the interest of freedom of expression and
the interest in protecting an individual's reputation conflict, then the
former will automatically prevail unless the plaintiff can show specific
egregious conduct on the part of the defendant. Within these narrow
limits, the New York Times case is entirely logical since the interests
protected by a cause of action for libel are not constitutional interests.
While the Supreme Court has often indicated in abstract, generalized
language that libel is not a form of protected speech,2 57 it has never
suggested that there is a constitutional right to have the integrity of one's
reputation shielded from the deleterious effect of defamatory statements.
The problem arises in Time, Inc. v. Hill, which attempts to use the
same conflict-resolving technique in the area of invasion of privacy. The
thrust of the Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill is that whenever the
right of privacy and the right of free expression collide, the courts must
defer to the latter unless the plaintiff can prove the defendant published
calculated falsehoods. If one assumes, as some courts have, that the
right of privacy is inherently inferior to the right of free expression, then
the conceptual basis of Time, Inc. v. Hill is justified. If, however, one
relies on York v. Story or Griswold and its progeny for the proposition
that the right of privacy protected by the tort actions under discussion is
as fundamental a right as that of free speech, then the preferential
technique of Time, Inc. v. Hill is improper. If the right of privacy and
the right of freedom of expression are deemed equally important, then
any conflict between the two arguably should be resolved by resorting to
the ad hoc case-by-case balancing technique Justice Harlan advocated
257. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114 at 777-81; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967). Accord, Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc., 307
F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
455-56 (1976); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (D.D.C. 1975);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975); PRossER, supra
note 1, § 118 at 832-33. These authorities hold that the privilege to report on public
proceedings is lost if the reportage is unfair or inaccurate.
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in Konigsberg.258 Such a technique would not follow hard and fast
preferential rules but rather would consider each case in context, in light
of such factors as the status of the plaintiff, the status of the defendant,
the cause of actions involved and the interests protected by that cause of
action, the interests at stake in terms of the public's need to be in-
formed about the matters which the defendant disclosed, and the
nature of the facts revealed. 25 9
The Court in Gertz partially attempted to use this technique; Gertz
reintroduces distinctions between suits brought by private persons and
those brought by public figures. It requires the courts in each case to
scrutinize fully the status of the plaintiff before allowing the defendant
to invoke the New York Times privilege as a defense. Gertz may apply
in privacy cases; as Justice Powell noted in his concurrence in Cox,
Gertz "recognized the need to establish a broad rule of general applica-
bility, acknowledging that such an approach necessarily requires treating
alike cases that involve differences as well as similarities."260 If Justice
Powell is correct then the Gertz holding may indeed implicitly under-
mine the assumptions underlying Time, Inc. v. Hill. It may signal the
Court's willingness to analyze both libel and invasion of privacy with a
more flexible technique, taking into account the various factors weighed
by the California Supreme Court in Kapellas and Briscoe.261 If privacy
is a fundamental right, as Griswold teaches, then Gertz, to the extent
that it adopts such a flexible technique by making the defense of
consitutional privilege depend upon the status of the plaintiff, is one
small but necessary step in the right direction.
258. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
259. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 966 (1976) (suggesting that Cox
was part of a line of cases that eschew subject matter classifications in favor of balanc-
ing the competing interests involved in cases where constitutional privilege is an issue);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975) (suggesting that when-
ever free speech and privacy collide, a resolution must ultimately depend on the facts
of each individual case). See also National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101,
1176 n.65 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (suggesting that while in limited instances privacy may out-
weigh journalistic license, Cox may require a different approach in the case of disclo-
sures of already public information).
260. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 499-500 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
261. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
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